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Questions of fact are for the jury, it is said, and questions of
law are for the judge. Ad quaestionem juris respondent judices,
ad quaestionem facti respondent juratores. This is the theme
which is found in every charge to a jury. The distinction be-
tween law and fact, however, is somewhat tenuous, as is evi-
denced by the legal jargon "mixed questions of law and fact,"
and it has given rise to the mistaken belief that the judge and
jury are separate institutions within the judicial process. There
is no separation of powers between judge and jury. The jury is
designed to help the judge reach a decision.1 A verdict, except a
verdict of acquittal in a criminal case, which for constitutional
reasons is unassailable 2 has no legal effect until judgment is
entered upon it, and it must be supported by the evidence.
In early history, jurors were used by the king for obtaining
information which he wanted for administrative purposes, as,
for example, in the compilation of the Doomsday Book. Subse-
quently, King Henry II converted the jury into an instrument
for doing justice. It was reasoned that a jury which gave the
king information for administrative purposes could also be used
to give him information for deciding a dispute.3 Under Edward
*Associate Professor, Tulane University School of Law.
1. See DEVLIN, TRIAL BY Juay (1956).
2. See Slovenko, The Law on Double Jeopardy, 30 TUL. L. REv. 409 (1956).
3. Magna Charta says "no free man can be taken, or imprisoned, or exiled,
or in any other manner destroyed, unless by the lawful judgment of his peers, or
by the law of the land." In the original Latin, the words used for "peers" were
"parium sucrum," which means literally, "his equals." Magna Charta was a
product of a feudal world of fixed classes. The guarantee was that a man would
be tried by men of his own rank and condition, not by his superiors or inferiors
but by men of his own class. Thus, the rights of a small tenant farmer could
not .be determined by a jury of barons, that is, by men of a class hostile to his
interests and anxious if it could to wipe out his rights in the land. This idea is
found centuries later in the principle that an alien indicted in England had a right
to a jury "de medietate linguae," made up half of aliens. See I. F. Stone's Weekly,
Vol. V, no. 24 (June 17, 1957). In a case involving a Negro, the United States
Supreme Court said, "What an accused is entitled to demand, under the Constitu-
tion of the United States, is that in organizing the grand jury as well as in the
empanelling of the petit jury, there shall be no exclusion of race, and no discrimi-
nation against them, because of their race or color." Martin v. Texas, 200 U.S.
316, 321 (1906). In the United States, the defendant is not entitled to have sit-
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III, in 1352, the petit jury changed from a body that acted on
its own knowledge into the jury as it is today, a body which ob-
tains its entire knowledge of the case from information received
in open court. But, notwithstanding the change, the jury still
derives its powers from the judge and from his willingness to
accept its verdict (with the exception of the criminal verdict of
acquittal) .4
There are informal and formal ways by which the judge in-
fluences and shapes the verdict of the jury. In early procedure
the trial judge found it especially necessary to exercise control
over the jury's verdict. New trials did not lie in felony cases,
bills of exceptions were non-existent, and the writ of error was
narrow in scope. Notwithstanding changes in procedure, control
over the jury remains important, inasmuch as it is not a body
of professional investigators. Cases are often intricate, involv-
ing much oral evidence and piles of documents. Jurors are not
particularly competent to assess the material, and until the trial,
are strangers to the evidence. Jurors are still drawn from the
neighborhood, not because they are familiar with the case, but
only because it would be inconvenient to bring them from afar.
II. SELECTION OF PANEL
Jurors, unlike scientific observers, are generally not "value-
free." The systematic exclusion of any portion of the population
from the jury venire is illegal, but the selection of the panel out
of the venire proceeds on radically different grounds. In the
American states, unlike in England, the parties to the litigation
have a great deal to do with the selection of the jury panel.
Counsel prefer not to select the trial jury in a haphazard man-
ner. On the voir dire examination, vigorous use is made of the
right to challenge prospective jurors. Each lawyer is scrupu-
lously dedicated to the selection of those jurors whose value sys-
tems will most favor his client's case. If chosen at random, the
jury, statistically speaking, would tend to reflect the dominant
views of the community. Instead, the lawyer tries to spin out
ting on the jury a percentage based on the proportion of his class to the popula-
tion in the community. The only right of the accused is that there be no "sys-
tematic exclusion" in the selection of jurors. See Robinson, Bias, Probability, and
Trial by Jury, 15 AM. SOCIOL. REV. 73 (1950) ; Slovenko, The Jury System in
Louisiana Criminal Law, 17 LoUISIANA LAW REviEw 655, 685 (1957). It has
been held that the accused can complain of systematic exclusion of a class only
when he is a member of that class. See State v. Lea, 228 La. 724, 84 So.2d 169
(1956), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 1007 (1956). Query: should the victim have a right
of complaint?
4. See DEVLIN, op. cit. supra note 1.
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the selection' of jurors who are biased in his favor.5 In effect,
counsel try the jury before the court tries the defendant.6
III. THE RULES OF EVIDENCE
The verdict is controlled by the rules of evidence. The col-
lection of the material is the task of the lawyers, and when it is
presented in court, the judge, and not the jury, rules on its ad-
missibility. Only the material which the law permits to be used
can go to the jury for consideration in reaching a verdict. The
law of evidence consists of categorical formulations, such as the
hearsay rule, which serve to sieve the material which gets into
the arena.7 The law of evidence also leaves to the judge the
broad power to exclude anything that he considers to be irrele-
vant. This procedure may be a good thing. It is not entirely an
insult to the intellectual powers of the jurors. It is an illustra-
tion of the duality of judge and jury rather than of their separa-
tion in the judicial process. As Sir Patrick Devlin put it, "A
judge who tries a case alone often has to give so much time to
noting down the evidence, and to fitting each incident as it comes
along into the structure of the case as a whole, that he may miss
some of the advantage that can be gained from just listening to
a witness and forming a general impression of his truthfulness
and reliability. ' 8
The law is not consistent in its trust of the jury. On the one
hand, the jury is not trusted to consider evidence for what it is
worth and is considered to need specially filtered evidence. Ju-
rors are not even trusted to take notes of the testimony.9 On the
other hand, the jury is credited with an almost inhuman ability
to regulate their minds according to the direction of the judge.
For example, the jury is trusted to follow the most subtle and
technical distinctions between the substantive and impeachment
use of testimony. To take another example, in the case of sev-
5. The selection of the jury panel is discussed at length in the author's article,
The Jury System in Louisiana Criminal Law, 17 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 655
:(1957).
6. Counsel try the judge too. See Slovenko, "Je Recuse!": The Disqualification
of a Judge, 19 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 644 (1959).7. Maine:.and Thayer, early legal historians, are of the opinion that all the
exclusionary rules of evidence owe their origin to the presence of the jury. But
see; e.g., WILLIAMS, THE:PROOF OF GUILT 149 (1955) ; McNabb v. United States,
318 U.S. 332 (1943) (ideals of justice are basis for some evidence rules).
8. See DEVLIN, op. cit. supra note 1, at 116.
9. See LA. R.S. 15:395 (1950). In National Airlines Inc. v. Stiles, 268 F.2d
400, 406, n. 6 (5th Cir. 1959), the court said: "The computation of interest in
such a;case.[Jones Act and FELA cases] might be an undesirably confusing as-
signment to give to the average jury."
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eral defendants, evidence is given that in law is admissible
against only one of the defendants, and the jury is supposed to
be able to consider the evidence against that defendant but to dis-
miss it from their minds when considering the others. 10
IV. THE CHARGE TO THE JURY
The charge to the jury is a vital part of the jury trial. The
judge's charge to the jury became important in the year 1352
when jurors lost their original character as witnesses. From
that date until the latter part of the seventeenth century, the
judge's instructions were often commands which were disobeyed
at the jurors' peril." A jury which persisted in giving a verdict
displeasing to the judge might be confined without meat, drink,
or fire until they became more tractable. 12 King James I de-
clared that judges should be as lions. After the "Glorious Revo-
lution" of 1688, the jury's function in a trial became more im-
portant. Judges in their charges began to adopt a persuasive
rather than a peremptory tone. Authoritative instructions gave
place to a recommendation which the jury was free to accept or
reject. 3 The judge summed up the evidence on both sides of the
case and assisted the jury by commenting upon the evidence in
their presence, but with the reservation that the ultimate de-
termination of the issue was with the jurors. 4
In the United States the development was somewhat differ-
ent. Statutes passed by many of the states impose a duty on the
trial judge to abstain from any expression of opinion or comment
upon the evidence. The American judge, unlike his contemporary
in England, cannot express an opinion or comment on the weight
or the sufficiency of the evidence, or comment on the credibil-
ity of witnesses or their manner of testifying.
10. See Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469 (1948); Ladd, 'Techniques
and Theory of Character Testimony, 24 IOWA L. REv. 498 (1939); WIIxAMs,
THE PROOF OF GUILT 150 (1955).
11. The court could fine the jury for delivering a bad verdict. See 1 CHITTY,
CRIMINAL LAW 653-660 (1836) ; Note, 87 U. PA. L. REV. 351, 352 (1939).
12. See R. v. Sir Nicholas Throckmorton, 1 How. St. Trials 870, 899; R. v.
Penn and Mead, 6 How. St. Trials 951, 963. It was said: "The hungry judges
soon the sentence sign, and wretches hang, that jurymen may dine."
13. See R. v. Dean of St. Asaph, 21 How. St. Trials 847, 1039 (1783) ; Law-
son & Keedy, Criminal Procedure in England, 1 J. CIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 595
(1910).
14. The judge in England does not himself examine the witnesses, except that
he may put supplementary questions. The examination of all witnesses is con-
ducted principally by the advocates of the parties. See WILLIAMS, THE PROOF OF
GUILT 23 (1955). In France, on the other hand, there is the interrogataire of the
accused by the presiding judge, who also takes the leading part in examining wit-
nesses. A bibliography of English literature on French criminal procedure appears
in Williams, op. cit. supra at 23, n. 3.
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In the United States the people, through the jury, have been
allowed to take an exceptionally active part in the administra-
tion of law. In England, counsel address their arguments on
points of law to the judge, and make no attempt to persuade the
jury on the law. In the United States, on the other hand, the
philosophy of democratic government was so strong that the the-
ory long prevailed that the jury could not only determine the
facts but judge the law as well.1 5 This right of the jury to in-
terpret the law as well as find the facts, however, has been gen-
erally rejected since the latter part of the nineteenth century. In
Sparf and Hansen v. United States, the majority of the United
States Supreme Court, in a fifty-six page opinion written by
Justice Harlan, held that the jury is bound, in criminal as in
civil cases, to follow the judge's instructions on all matters of
law.16 In a dissenting opinion of some seventy-three pages, Jus-
tice Gray said that it was preferable, historically and politically,
to acknowledge that the jury had a right in a criminal case to
disregard the court's instructions. Justice Gray expressed the
view in his dissent that "the jury, upon the general issue of
guilty or not guilty in a criminal case, have the right, as well
as the power, to decide, according to their own judgment and
consciences, all questions, whether of law or of fact, involved in
that issue." The meaning of the rule, "the facts are for the jury
15. See Howe, Juries as Judges of Criminal Law, 52 HARv. L. REv. 582
(1939).
16. 156 U.S. 51 (1895). The trial judge said to the jury: "[I]f a felonious
homicide has been committed, of which you are to be the judges from the proof,
there is nothing in this case to reduce it below the grade of murder. In other
words, it may be in the power of the jury under the indictment by which these
defendants are accused and tried of finding them guilty of a less crime than mur-
der, to wit, manslaughter, or an attempt to commit murder; yet, as I have said
in this case, if a felonious homicide has been committed at all, of which I repeat
you are the judges, there is nothing to reduce it below the grade of murder." 156
U.S. at 60. The defendants were convicted of murder, and the United States Su-
preme Court approved the instructions to the jury and affirmed the conviction.
Defense counsel contended that "although there may have not been any evidence
whatever to support a verdict of guilty of an offense less than the one charged-
and such was the case here - yet, to charge the jury, as matter of law, that the
evidence in the case did not authorize any verdict except one of guilty or one of
not guilty of the particular offense charged, was an interference with their legiti-
mate functions, and, therefore, with the constitutional right of the accused to be
tried by a jury." Id. at 99. The United States Supreme Court held that the trial
court did not transcend "its authority when saying, as in effect it did, that in
view of the evidence the only verdict the jury could under the law properly render
would be either one of guilty of the offence charged or one of not guilty of the
offence charged." 156 U.S. at 63. "A verdict of guilty of an offence less than the
one charged would have been in flagrant disregard of all the proof, and in violation
by the jury of their obligation to render a true verdict. There was an entire active
absence of evidence upon which to rest a verdict of guilty of manslaughter or of
simple assault. A verdict of that kind would have been the exercise by the jury
of the power. to commute the punishment for an offence actually committed, and
thus impose a punishment different from that prescribed by law." Id. at 63-64.
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and the law is for the judge," according to Justice Gray, is that
it is "the bounden duty of the judge to lay down the law as it
strikes him, and that of the jury to accede to it, unless they have
superior knowledge on the subject." The Sparf and Hansen case,
decided in 1895, is the Supreme Court's authoritative denial of
the jury's right, but not of its power, to disregard the judge's
instructions. In Louisiana, the jury's duty to take the law from
the court has been enunciated in constitutional and statutory
provisions. In early years the juries were made judges of law in
both civil and criminal cases. 17 Until 1871, the Louisiana Su-
preme Court emphatically stated that in criminal cases the jury
had not only the power but the right to disregard the judge's
instructions.' The case of State v. Talley in 1871 deflected the
current of judicial opinion in Louisiana away from the recog-
nition of the jury's right.19 In 1878 Chief Justice Manning, in a
concurring opinion, objected to "the legal heresy," recently
grown up, of instructing criminal juries that they have the pow-
er to disregard the court's opinions without adding that "the
exercise of this physical power is itself a moral wrong."20 In
1879 the Constitution was amended to provide that "the jury in
all criminal cases shall be the judges of the law and of the facts
on the question of guilt or innocence, having been charged as to
the law applicable to the case by the presiding judge."'2 1 In State
v. Ford,2 2 the court held in 1885 that by this provision the
framers of the constitution "merely proposed to incorporate in
the organic law a principle which had been steadily enforced in
our criminal jurisprudence since the dawn of its existence." In
this case, the Supreme Court said that the trial court was cor-
rect in instructing the jury that it was bound to follow the law
as given by the court.2 3
The Louisiana Constitution of 1921 contains a provision iden-
tical to the provision in the 1879 Constitution.2 4 The article is
severed into two provisions of the 1928 Code of Criminal Pro-
17. See Bostwick v. Gasquet, 10 La. 80 (1836) ; Spofford v. Pemberton, 12
Rob. 162 (1845) ; State v. Scott, 11 La. Ann. 429 (1856).
18. See State v. Scott, 11 La. Ann. 429 (1856) ; State v. Ballerio, 11 La. Ann.
81 (1856) ; State v. Jurche, 17 La. Ann. 71 (1865) ; State v. Saliba, 18 La. Ann.
35 (1866).
19. 23 La. Ann. 677 (1871).
20. State v. Johnson, 30 La. Ann. 904, 905, 906 (1878).
21. LA. CONST. art. 168 (1879). Accord: LA. CONST. art. 179 (1898) ; LA.
CONST. art. 179 (1913) ; LA. CONST. art. XIX, § 9 (1921).
22. 37 La. Ann. 443, 465 (1885).
23.: Accord: State v. Vinson, 37 La. Ann. 792 (1885) ; State v. Menard, 110
La. 1098, 35 So. 360 (1903).
24. LA. CONST. art. XIX, § 9 (1921).
[Vol. XX
1960] JURY VERDICT IN CRIMINAL LAW 663
cedure.2 5 Article 383 provides that the jury is the judge of the
law as well as the exclusive judge of the facts of the case. Article
385 provides that the judge shall charge the jury on the law ap-
plicable to the case and shall charge the jury that it is their duty
to accept and to apply the law as laid down for them by the
judge. On the face of it, the two provisions seem to be incon-
sistent, as they. apparently embrace the positions of both Justice
Harlan and Justice Gray.26
A. General Charges
Under Anglo-American law in criminal cases every man is
presumed to be innocent until he is proved to be guilty. The
judge, in the presence of the defendant or his counsel, 27 is re-
quired to charge the jury that the accused is presumed by law to
be innocent until his guilt shall have been established beyond a
reasonable doubt.28 To convict, the jury must have, after a care-
ful consideration and weighing of all the evidence, an abiding
conviction to a reasonable and moral certainty of the truth of
the charge.
A typical instruction by a trial judge to the jury in this re-
gard follows:
"You have heard the evidence in the case and the argu-
ment of counsel. It now becomes my duty to charge you as
to the law :in the case. While you are the exclusive judges of
both the law and the facts, it is your duty to take the law as
I charge it to you.
"I am not permitted to comment upon the facts in the
case, or the credibility of the witnesses. It is for you to de-
termine what has or has not been proven, and what weight
25. See LA. R.S. 15:383, 385 (1950).
26. It is said that under Articles 383 and 385, the court shall instruct the jury
as to those principles of law applicable to the theory of the case contended for by
both lawyers, and the jury shall decide between those several principles of law
which are applicable to the facts of the case. STANLEY, INSTRUCTIONS TO JURIES
3 (1933). The jury today, it seems, has the power, but not the right, to disregard
the judge's instruction on the law. To illustrate that the jury has that power, it
might be pointed out that a verdict of acquittal cannot for any reason be tres-
passed upon. A:verdict of acquittal is a sacred cow. Furthermore, in Louisiana,
as in most other states, a juror is not competent to explain, qualify, or impeach
any verdict found by the body of which he was a member. LA. R.S. 15:470 (1950).
A juror therefore cannot testify that he disregarded the judge's instruction in
reaching a decision. The verdict of the jury is inscrutable. The jury gives no
reasons for its' decision.
27. LA. R.S. 15:392 (1950).
28. LA. R.S. 15:387 (1950). See Waldman, Origins of Legal Doctrine of Rea-
8onable Doubt, 20 J. HIST. IDEAS 299 (1959).
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you will give to the various witnesses in the case, taking into
consideration their opportunities for knowledge of the facts
in regard to which they testify and their interest in the case.
"The fact that an accused stands before you charged
with a crime creates no presumption or prejudice against
him. On the contrary, the law throws around him the pro-
tection of the presumption of innocence. The effect of this is
to impose upon the State the burden of proving his guilt. The
State, however, is not called upon to prove the guilt of the
accused with absolute certainty beyond any possible doubt or
conjecture. It is sufficient if the State prove the accused
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
"The term 'reasonable doubt' defines itself. It is such a
doubt as would influence a reasonable man in the ordinary
affairs of life. It must arise from the evidence or lack of
evidence. '29
However, with regard to the presumption of innocence and
the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, an elaborate
charge such as the above is not necessary. The trial judge is not
required to do anything more than read Article 387,30 but if only
this is done, an unjustified acquittal is made more probable. One
reason for acquittals is the difficulty in defining for the benefit
of some jurors the expression "reasonable doubt." They often
think that "proof beyond a reasonable doubt" means proof to an
absolute certainty. A person cannot really be certain a man is
guilty of an offense, they seem to say, unless he is seen to do it.
In addition to the charge on the presumption of innocence
and proof beyond a reasonable doubt, the judge is required to
charge the jury on the law applicable to all offenses of which
the accused can be found guilty under the indictment.8 1 For ex-
ample, under an indictment for murder, the defendant can be
29. Charge of Hon. E. P. Mills, District Judge, Caddo Parish, in State v.
Bussa, as reported in STANLEY, INSTRUCTIONS TO JURIES 6 (1933). See also Holt
& Barns, Oaths and Standard Charges to Jury in Civil, Eminent Domain and Cap-
ital Cases in Florida, 7 MIAMI L.Q. 147, 164-5 (1953).
30. The article states that the judge must charge the jury that "every person
accused of crime is presumed by law to be innocent until his guilt shall have been
established beyond a reasonable doubt; that it is the duty of the jury, in consider-
ing the evidence and in applying to that evidence the law as given by the court,
to give the defendant the benefit of every reasonable doubt arising out of the evi-
dence or out of the want of evidence in the case, and that, if not convinced of his
guilt, beyond a reasonable doubt, it is their duty to find him not guilty ..
LA. R.S. 15:387 (1950).
31. See LA. R.S. 15:386, 406 (1950).
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found guilty of manslaughter.3 2 Since this is so, the judge must
charge the law as to the lesser included offense which the jury
can return as a verdict. The judge, after charging the jury, gives
the jury a written list of the verdicts responsive to the crime
charged, with each of those responsive verdicts separately and
fully stated.33 Article 387 points out that the judge must charge
the jury that they can only find the defendant guilty of that
grade of the offense upon which they have no reasonable doubt.
B. Special Charges
The prosecution and the defense each have the right to pres-
ent, before the argument has begun, written charges for the con-
sideration of the court.84 The judge's refusal to give the charge
is error, provided the evidence in the case supports the charge
requested by counsel. Any special charge which was covered by
the general charge3 5 or which is not wholly correct and wholly
pertinent need not be given.36 Counsel should, therefore, be care-
ful that his requested charge is accurate and not so broad or
abstract as to make it possible for a proper refusal by the judge.
The judge, however, when special requested instructions are
32. See id. 15:386 for list of responsive verdicts.
33. The list is taken into the juryroom for use by the jury during its delib-
eration. See id. 15:386.1.
34. Id. 15:390. The prosecution or the defense can demand, prior to the swear-
ing of the first witness, that the judge deliver his charge in writing. Id. 15:389.
A refusal by the judge to reduce his charge to writing is reversible error. See
State v. Rini, 151 La. 163, 91 So. 664 (1922) ; State v. Porter, 35 La. Ann. 535
(1883). A delivery of the general charge in writing and the special charge orally
does not satisfy the requirement, and is reversible error. State v. Wilson, 169
La. 684, 125 So. 854 (1930). When the case is tried without a jury, the judge is
not required to deliver the charge in writing. See State v. Dominguez, 230 La.
371, 88 So.2d 660 (1956). In a case tried before a judge alone, counsel on each
side can present to the court for its consideration propositions in the same manner
as charges would be presented were the case tried by a jury. LA. R.S. 15:393
(1950). Counsel can demand the ruling of the court on such propositions. A bill
of exception should be reserved to an adverse ruling. Id. 15:393.
35. State v. Espinosa, 223 La. 520, 66 So.2d 323 (1953) ; State v. Matassa,
222 La. 363, 62 So.2d 609 (1953) ; see Note, 33 MICH. L. REV. 126 (1934). An
instruction fully covering subject submitted to the jury should not be repeated, as
needless repetition amounts to argument by the court and may mislead the jury.
See Howard v. Cincinnati Sheet Metal and Roofing Co., 234 F.2d 233 (7th Cir.
1956). In England, it appears that the judge must warn the jury of the danger
of acting on the uncorroborated evidence of a young child, and it is not a matter
for the discretion of the judge. See CROSS, EVIDENCE 135 (1958). Cf. People v.
Porcaro, 189 N.Y.S.2d 194, 6 N.Y.2d 248 (1959).
36. LA. R.S. 15:390 (1950). See State v. Morris, 222 La. 480, 62 So.2d
649 (1953),; State v. Franques, 156 La. 462, 100 So. 682 (1924). The refusal of
a request to charge that the indictment is a mere accusation and no evidence of
guilt is not reversible error where presumption of innocence, burden of proof, and
* reasonable doubt are properly charged, unless something can be pointed to indicat-
ing that the jury could have been misled into thinking that the indictment was
evidential. See Sconyers v. United States, 54 F.2d 68 (5th Cir. 1932) ; see also
STANLEY, INSTRUCTIONS TO JURIES 3 (1933).
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partly correct and partly erroneous, is not bound to affirm or
repudiate them as a whole, but may restate them in his own
terms.3 7 Moreover, the trial judge may modify, rather than re-
fuse, a special requested instruction on an abstract proposition
of law so as to make it applicable to the case. 88 A judge who re-
fuses to charge the jury as requested by defendant on the ground
that the requested charge is inapplicable to the facts should not
state his reasons for his refusal in the presence of the jury. To
do so amounts to a comment on the facts and is reversible error.8 9
An erroneous charge by the judge which is prejudicial to the
defendant constitutes reversible error.40 An erroneous instruc-
tion which is favorable to the defendant, however, gives him no
cause for complaint. Thus, in State v. Enloe41 the trial judge's
erroneous instruction that a concurrence of twelve jurors was
necessary for a verdict was not reversible error because the error
was prejudicial only to the state.
The question may be raised as to whether the trial court can
voluntarily recall the jury, after they have retired to the jury
room to deliberate upon the verdict, to give them a further
charge. 42 The general view is that the voluntary recalling of the
jury and giving further instructions is in the discretion of the
trial judge. 43 A further charge is justified whenever the jury
has not been fully and properly charged. However, a contrary
37. State v. Miller, 41 La. Ann. 677, 6 So. 546 (1889) ; State v. Durr, 39
La. Ann. 751, 2 So. 546 (1887).
38. State v. Sehon, 137 La. 83, 68 So. 221 (1915). The trial judge is; not
obliged to give an instruction in language requested by defendant, but may use
words of his own selection. Herzog v. United States, 226 F.2d 561 (9th Cir. 1955).
39. See State v. Iverson, 136 La. 982, 68 So. 98 (1915). . .
40. See State v. Conda, 156 La. 679, 101 So. 19 (1924). In this-case a:charge
that the plea of self-defense is an admission of the killing was held to constitute
reversible error. See Note, 36 VA. L. REv. 696 (1950). Every objection to the
charge given, or to a refusal to charge as requested, or to a refusal to give the
charge in writing, must be made by a bill of exceptions reserved before the jury
retires to deliberate upon their verdict. LA. R.S. 15:391 (1950) ; State v. Morgan,
175 La. 730, 144 So. 434 (1932) (objection comes too late when raised for first
time in motion for new trial). The judge is thereby permitted to cprrect himself
if he has made an error. The bill must be accompanied by a statement of facts
that will show the error in the charge given, or in the refusal to charge. as re-
quested, or that the request to give the charge in writing was, refused. LA. R.S.
15:391 (1950) ; State v. Warlick, 179 La. 997, 155 So. 460 (1934) (a general
objection to a charge presents nothing for review, being too vague and indefinite).
The Supreme Court stated in State v. Chase, 37 La. Ann. 165, 170 (1885), that
the judge's charge to the jury constitutes reversible error "only when a court is
satisfied that it has worked a real injury, that for such error a different result
would have been reached."
41. 153 La., 219, 95 'So. 650 (1923).
42. The Code allows a juror to request further instructions. See LA. R.S.
15:396 (1950).
43. See State v. Frisby, 19 La. Ann. 143 (1867) ; Angelle v., United ;States :31
F.2d 245 (5th Cir. 1929).
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view has been argued that the defendant is entitled to the benefit
of the chance that some jurors might have already made up their
minds as to his innocence. 44
V. JUDGE'S RIGHT TO COMMENT ON THE FACTS
In most of the United States, except in the federal courts, the
judge is not allowed to comment on or sum up the evidence. The
charge is strictly confined to the statement of the principles of
law which the jury has to apply. The charge as a result is usual-
ly short and colorless.
Article 384 of the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure
provides that the jury decides the weight and credibility of the
evidence, and that the judge charges only as to the law. It is
stated: "It belongs to the jury alone to determine the weight and
credibility of the evidence, but the judge shall have the right to
instruct the jury on the law but not upon the facts of the case.
The judge shall not state or recapitulate the evidence, repeat the
testimony of any witness, or give any opinion as to what facts
have been proved or refuted." The judge may put supplementary
questions to witnesses during the presentation of evidence, 45 but
any reference, even inadvertent, to the weight or credibility of
a witness' testimony or to any collateral fact during the trial will
result in a reversion of the ruling and a remand of the case for
retrial."
It has been urged that the judge should be allowed to com-
ment on or sum up the facts, provided the jury is left the exclu-
sive function of deciding the facts.47 Approximately ten states,
in addition to the federal courts,48 adhere to the common law rule
44. See Baker v. United States, 156 F.2d 386, 390 (5th Cir. 1946).
45. As for judges cross-examining witnesses, Mr. William Seagle expresses the
view: "[I]t is doubtful that the truth would be ascertained more frequently than
through cross-examination by lawyers, who as the result of long practice are more
skilled in the art than judges. Moreover, while cross-examination of witnesses is
a useful technique, its effectiveness has been grossly exaggerated, and it often
requires a persistence in nagging and even browbeating witnesses which, while
reconcilable with the lawyer's function, is not with the judge's dignity. Indeed,
this is the major obstacle to the cross-examination of witnesses by judges. A judge
who becomes too active in questioning witnesses is likely to have his impartiality
impugned at once by the litigants and their counsel. They will no longer believe
that he is an impartial umpire when he comes to deliver his charge to the jury."
SasoGL, LAW: THE SCIENCE OF INEFFICIENCY 34 (1952).
46. The prohibition against judicial comment on the evidence, however, does
not refer to comments made in a preliminary proceeding. See State v. Lea, 228
La. 724, 84 So.2d 169 (1955).
47. See Adams, The Proposed Code of Criminal Procedure, 9 LOYOLA L.J. 53,
62 et seq. (1928).
48. On the right of the judge to comment on evidence in federal courts, see
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that the judge has the right to comment upon or digest the evi-
dence so long as he makes it clear to the jury that his comments
are not binding upon them. 49 In these courts, the judge analyzes
the evidence on both sides, points out what is uncontroverted,
and reduces the case to as few points as possible.
The principal argument against judicial comment on the evi-
dence is that it constitutes an invasion of the province of the
jury."0 The restriction apparently originated in the distrust of
judges as servants of the Crown that naturally filled the minds
of the Founding Fathers. But the remedy lies, it seems, in the
selection of impartial judges.51 Sir Patrick Devlin says that
those persons who maintain that the judge should not meddle
with the facts are victims of the deceptive brocard that the facts
are for the jury and the law for the judge.52 Professor Thayer
has written that trial by jury which does not allow the judge to
comment on the evidence is "not trial by jury in any historic
sense of the words.
53
The trial judge's appreciation of the evidence may or may
not be accepted by the jury. The view that judicial comment on
the evidence may improperly influence the jury assumes that the
jury will blindly and meekly accept the view of the judge. Such
an assumption impeaches the validity of the whole jury system
Notes, 2 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 103 (1933), 12 TEX. L. REV. 234 (1933), 1 U. CHR.
L. REV. 335 (1933), 40 W. VA. L. REV. 79 (1933).
49. See HALL, HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 291-2 (4th ed. 1792) ; ORFIELD,
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FROM ARREST TO APPEAL 457-459 (1947); Comment, 30
MicH. L. REV. 1303, 1307, n. 11 (1932). Section 325 of the A.L.I. Code of Crim-
inal Procedure recommends: "The court shall instruct the jury regarding the law
applicable to the facts of the cause, and may make such comment on the evidence
and testimony as in its opinion is necessary for the proper determination of the
cause. It shall, if requested, inform the jury that they are the exclusive judges
of all questions of fact, whether requested or not, the court shall so inform them
if it comments on the evidence, the testimony or the credibility of any witness."
See Notes, 24 TEMP. L.Q. 363 (1951) ; 22 CALIF. L. REV. 564 (1934) ; 15 A.B.A.J.
647 (1929). It is also considered to be an insult to the intelligence of the jury.
Sir Alan Herbert expresses the point in his book, Uncommon Law, where he
makes Mr. Justice Swallow address the jury as follows: "Gentlemen of the jury,
the facts of this distressing and important case have already been put before you
some four or five times, twice by prosecuting counsel, twice by counsel for the
defense, and once at least by each of the various witnesses who have been heard;
but so low is my opinion of your understanding that I think it. is necessary, in
the simplest language, to tell you the facts again." Quoted in WILLIAMS, THE
PROOF OF GUILT 237-238 (1955).
51. In Louisiana, the fact of bias or prejudice without interest is not cause
for recusation of a judge, and therefore there is this justification for retaining the
prohibition against judicial comment upon the evidence. See Slovenko, "Je
Recuse!" The Disqualification of a Judge, 19 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 644
(1959).
52. See DEVLIN, op. cit. supra note 1, at 120.
53. THAYER, PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT TIlE COMMON LAW 188
(1898).
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and, if true, would justify restricting, rather than enlarging, the
influence and power of the jury.
The principal arguments in favor of permitting judicial com-
ment on the evidence are well known. They are: It would reduce
the time, strain, and scandal in empaneling juries, for if the
judge is allowed to make clear, dispassionate, and candid anal-
ysis of the merits of a case, counsel would no longer attempt to
secure a jury which is susceptible to prejudice and sympathy; it
would facilitate the introduction of evidence, for the value of
prejudicial evidence would be so minimized that counsel would
neither be so apt to offer it nor vigorously oppose its admission;
it would enable the judge to exercise much more effective control
over the conduct of the trial, for he would no longer have to
guard his every statement lest he should slip and make an inti-
mation as to his opinion on the evidence; it would simplify the
task of instructing the jury in the law, as the dividing line be-
tween law and fact is extremely fine; and it would reduce the
necessity for new trials.54 In England it is the duty of the judge
to object to inadmissible evidence for the prosecution even
though counsel for the defense makes no objection, on the theory
that it is damaging to the defendant's case for his lawyer to have
to argue that evidence is inadmissible. 55
In England the judge is not allowed to use language which
54. See Sunderland, The Inefficiency of the American Jury, 13 MIcH. L. REV.
302 (1915) ; Comments, 30 MICH. L. REV. 1303 (1932), 25 CALIF. L. REV. 212
(1937) ; Note, 24 TEMP. L.Q. 363 (1951).
The court in People v. Rathbun, 21 Wend. (N.Y.) 509, 550 (1839) said: "[I]t
is important in these circumstantial cases above all others, that the judge, who
is a man of legal knowledge, and great experience in trials should go through with
the proofs in his charge, separating the chaff from the grain; and pointing out to
the jury, as far as the imperfection of human language will enable him to do,
the individual, the relative and collective weight of those proofs which are ma-
terial. In omitting to do this, he would be guilty of a great neglect of duty. He
is, in general, more collected and calm, and less open to the influence of popular
sentiment than the jury; and in many cases, miserable would be the condition of
prisoners, if the power which is questioned should be denied. How many innocent
men, already doomed by public opinion, have been saved from the scaffold, by the
firm and bold opinion of the judge, which seeks to avoid every thing extraneous,
and base itself upon the law and the evidence; the law which commands him to
act not only as its just, but its humane minister. It is equally important to the
public, that he should frankly give his opinion to the jury upon the evidence
which bears against the prisoner. Excluded personally from the concerns of com-
mercial life, he is less interested in a severe pursuit of the man whose crime has
struck at its existence, than, perhaps, any jury that can be impaneled; while the
tenure of his office was intended to place him beyond the attacks of political power,
on the pretence that he may have been too lenient in the conduct of state prosecu-
tions. He is, therefore, the safest possible instructor of the jury, both as to the
law and the evidence. Indeed the act of estimating the weight of the latter is but
an application of the law to the proofs."
55. See WILLiAMS, THE PROOF OF GUILT 33 (1955).
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leads the jury to think that he is directing them that they must
find the facts in the way that he indicates. Bacon's advice to the
English judge is well-known: "You shall be a light to jurors to
open their eyes, not a guide to lead them by the noses."'5 6 Fur-
thermore, in England, a "misdirection of fact" is ground for ap-
peal, but it is difficult to define a misdirection of fact 5 7
It may be worthwhile to examine a few cases arising in Lou-
isiana for the purpose of illustrating its rule against judicial
comment. In the case of State v. Davis,58 which involved an ac-
cusation of shooting with intent to murder, the district attorney
in the course of his argument stated that the prosecuting witness
did not have a knife on him when he was shot. The accused ob-
jected, saying that the fact had not been proved, and requested
the court to instruct the jury to disregard this statement of the
district attorney. The judge, overruling the objection, stated, in
the presence of the jury: "I distinctly remember that it has been
testified to by many witnesses that the prosecuting witness did
not have a knife on his person at the time of the shooting." The
Louisiana Supreme Court, reversing the decision of the trial
court, held that the prohibition against judicial comment is not
restricted to the charge alone, but applies as well to whatever
the judge may say in the presence of the jury during the prog-
ress of the trial.59 In other words, the decision expands the doc-
trine of Article 384, relating to the charge to the jury, to the
entire trial. The judge cannot at any time state or repeat to the
jury the testimony of any witness, or give any opinion as to
what facts have been proved or disproved. The trial judge should
have given his reason for refusing the instruction only in the per
curiam attached to the bill of exception, and not in the presence
and hearing of the jury. The case illustrates the care which the
trial judge must exercise in the conduct of the trial.
In the case of State v. Harrison" the judge instructed the
jury: "Under the law the defendant, or accused party, is a com-
petent witness in his own behalf, and has the right to testify if
he chooses to do so, or not, as he may deem proper. In the event
he does testify you are to weigh and determine the credibility
56. Quoted id. at 256 (1955). See also Lawson & Keedy, Criminal Procedure
in England, 1 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 595 (1910).
57. See DEVLIN, op. cit. supra note 1 at 117.
58. 140 La. 925, 74 So. 201 (1917).
59. The court based its decision on the constitutional provision that the jury
in all criminal cases shall be judges of the law and of the facts on the question
of guilt or innocence. See LA. CONST. art. XIX, § 9 (1921).
60. 167 La. 855, 120 So. 477 (1929).
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of his testimony the same as you do that of any other witness.
It is left entirely with you to determine and say just what weight
and credit you will give to it, taking into account the interest
he has in the case and in the outcome, if you deem proper to do
so." The defendant, who testified in the case, objected to the
charge. The Supreme Court upheld the defendant's position that
the trial judge is without right to single out any witness who has
taken the stand and to instruct the jury that they may consider,
in weighing the defendant's evidence, the interest that he has in
the outcome of the trial. The court held the judge's instruction
to the jury to be a comment on the facts of the case requiring
a reversal.
An even more stringent application of the rule prohibiting
judicial comment appeared in the case of State v. Watson.0 The
defendant was indicted for the crime of assault with intent to
rape. The district attorney in the course of his argument to the
jury asked the court whether any evidence was presented in re-
gard to the character of the prosecutrix. In reply the court an-
swered in the presence of the jury that there was no such evi-
dence. The Supreme Court was of the opinion that the statement
was a comment upon the facts, amounting to a conclusion
reached by the judge and expressed by him to the jury. This,
the court held, was contrary to the rule of law forbidding the
judge to express an opinion on the facts of the case. It seems,
however, that the trial judge did not comment or express an
opinion on the facts, but merely made a statistical statement as
to the status of the case, just as, for example, would be a reply
by the judge in answer to a question as to how many witnesses
had testified.
The court enunciated a more flexible position in State v.
Richey.62 According to the evidence, the deceased was shot three
the first assault. The Supreme Court held that the charge by the
trial judge was not a comment on the facts. The court said that
a judge charges upon the facts when he expresses an opinion
times by the accused, two of the shots struck the front portion of
the body and the third and final shot struck the back of the de-
ceased's head. The accused's defense was self-defense. The judge
charged the jury that, as a general rule, pursuing a retreating
adversary and killing him is not justifiable as done in self-
defense, though the deceased brought on the difficulty or made
61. 159 La. 779, 106 So. 302 (1925).
62. 198 La. 88, 3 So.2d 285 (1941).
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upon what has been proven to the jury, or when he assumes a
given state of facts as proven, but not when he expresses his
opinion of the law arising from a state of facts which may or
may not have been established before the jury, and upon the
proof of which he abstains from intimating any opinion. The
court further stated that a judge has the right to assume, in his
instructions to the jury, a hypothetical state of facts, to charge
on the law as to it, and then to tell the jury that if they believe
such a state of facts to be proved, it amounts to a commission of
the crime charged. The caution is for the judge to avoid any
indication to the jury of his opinion as to the proof on any fact.
The ruling of the Richey case is sound. It is impossible for a
judge to charge a jury properly unless he relates his charge to
the case at hand.
A good illustration of the view that the judge must neces-
sarily consider the facts in order that he may give an appropri-
ate charge appeared earlier in the case of State v. Williams.6"
The defendant, on trial for murder, justified the killing on the
ground of self-defense, while the state contended that the only
reason for the homicide was the spitting by the deceased of to-
bacco juice on the floor and window of a poolhall. The trial
judge charged the jury: "I charge you that the mere spitting of
tobacco juice on the floor or window of a poolroom will not justi-
fy the killing of a man. . . ." The defendant objected that the
charge was a "direct comment" upon the facts of the case. No
error, the Supreme Court ruled, as the remarks of the trial judge
were not a comment on the facts but were merely a statement of
the law applicable to the facts of the case. The trial judge
charged the law applicable to the defendant's plea of self-defense.
The judge did not review the evidence, so as to influence the
verdict on the facts, nor did he express any opinion as to what
facts had, or had not, been proven.
In the case of State v. Burris,6 4 a prosecution for the crime of
attempted aggravated rape, the judge charged the jury that they
take into consideration all of the facts and circumstances sur-
rounding the case, "including any testimony which may have
been offered tending to show the extent and purpose of assault-
ing the party, and any attempt to remove her garments and the
nature of the garments removed." Counsel for the defendant
argued prejudice in that the charge directed particular atten-
63. 155 La. 9, 98 So. 738 (1924).
64. 204 La. 608, 16 So.2d 124 (1943).
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tion of the jury to the torn underwear that was introduced in
evidence. The Supreme Court, affirming the conviction of the
trial court, relied on its ruling in the case of State v. Richey,
65
that mere reference to the evidence, without assuming any fact
proven or expressing or indicating any opinion of the law arising
from the facts which may or may not have been established be-
fore the jury, does not warrant setting aside the verdict. The
Supreme Court pointed out that the trial judge in his charge did
not assume or indicate that any fact was proved or disproved, or
that the judge intimated any opinion thereon.
In the case of State v. Goodwin,66 a murder prosecution, the
judge said, "This is a serious case." The defendant objected that
the statement is a comment upon the facts of the case in that the
judge, by reason of the words used, is giving his opinion that the
case is close. The Supreme Court was of the opinion that the
bill of exception was without merit. The defendant was accused
of murder and the jury, therefore, knew that the case was a seri-
ous one. The judge had no intention of commenting upon the
facts of the case, the weight of the evidence or the credibility of
the witnesses, or the guilt or innocence of the accused; and the
Supreme Court was satisfied that no such impression was con-
veyed to the jury.
VI. JUDGE'S RIGHT TO COMMENT ON FAILURE OF ACCUSED TO
TESTIFY
In early history, the accused was deprived of the right to take
the stand in his defense.6 7 It was a long time before he gained
the right to testify, and when he did obtain this valuable right,
he was also given, almost paradoxically, the privilege to remain
silent.68 The theory of the common law is that everyone accused
of crime is presumed innocent until proven guilty, and being in-
nocent in the eyes of the law, the defendant is not called upon to
meet accusing testimony by contradiction or explanation.
65. 198 La. 88, 3 So.2d 285 (1941).
66. 189 La. 443, 179 So. 591 (1938).
67. In England the defendant was not allowed to call witnesses until the year
1640 and was not allowed to have counsel until 1836. Thereafter, the defendant
was allowed by some judges to make an unsworn statement, but it was only in
1898, after much debate, that the English Criminal Evidence Act allowed him to
testify under oath. In the United States, a federal statute was passed in 1878
which-allowed an accused person to give evidence on his own behalf. See WIL-
LIAMS, THE PROOF OF GUILT 5 (1955).
68. Under the English Criminal Evidence Act of 1898, the accused has the




The law imposes silence upon the prosecutor and judge,
otherwise vain would be rendered the privilege of the accused
to testify or not to testify in his own behalf. Comment is not
allowed on a person's failure to do that which the law expressly
says he is not required to do.0 9
But may the judge give a favorable instruction on the de-
fendant's silence? Would this be considered prejudicial, inas-
much as it calls attention to the fact that the defendant failed to
testify? It is considered preferable for the judge to say nothing
about the matter unless requested by the defendant.
70
VII. JUDGE'S RIGHT TO COMMENT ON THE PUNISHMENT
The punishment which will be meted out in case of conviction
influences the jury's verdict, especially in a doubtful case. May
the judge inform the jury of the consequences of its verdict?
The function of the jury in a criminal case is to pass upon
the guilt or innocence of the person on trial. The jury has noth-
ing to do with the question of punishment or treatment of the
offender, but only with his guilt or innocence. 71 In some in-
stances they may fix the grade of the offense72 and in capital
cases they may qualify their verdict so as to remit the death
penalty.73 But beyond that, the jury is not concerned with the
quantum or kind of punishment to be inflicted. 74 The sentence
is a function of the judge.
There is no statute in Louisiana authorizing juries to qualify
their verdicts in non-capital cases by recommending that the
court extend mercy to the defendant. However, the custom has
69. Rule 201(3) of the A.L.I. Model Code of Evidence (1942) would allow
the judge to comment upon the accused's failure to testify. The English Criminal
Evidence Act of 1898 forbids the prosecution from commenting upon the accused's
failure to testify, but permits the judge to do so. See WILLIAMS, THE PROOF OF
GUILT 57 (1855).
70. See Notes, 46 MIcH. L. REV. 684 (1948) ; 13 MOD. L. REV. 378 (1950)
see also STANLEY, INSTRUCTIONS TO JURIES 3-4 (1933). It is error for the court
to refuse to instruct the jury that the defendant did not have to take the stand.
See Baker v. United States, 156 F.2d 386 (5th Cir. 1946).
71L See State v. Doucet, 177 La. 63, 147 So. 500 (1933). A statement in a
verdict of conviction fixing the punishment is surplusage. State v. Burns, 30 La.
Ann. 679 (1878).
72..See LA. R.S. 15:386, 406 (1950).
73. Id. 15:409 provides that "in all capital cases the jury may qualify its ver-
dict of guilty with the addition of 'without capital punishment,' in which case the
punishment shall be imprisonment at hard labor for life."
74. Id. 15:410 declares that "in any case, not capital, any qualification of or
addition to a verdict of guilty, beyond a specification of the crime as to which the
verdict is found is without effect upon the finding."
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been for juries to make such recommendation if they see fit: A
recommendation of clemency, however, is not considered'as a
qualification of the verdict, but is regarded as surplusage.7 *' The
court has expressly refrained from condemning this practice.' In
cases where juries seek the advice of the court as to whether
they may make such recommendations, there is no error in: in-
structing them that they may do so. But, in instructing them,
the court should also inform them that, while it is within their
province and power to make such recommendation, yet the court
is not bound by it, and that it is entirely within its discretion
whether such recommendation be regarded in fixing the punish-
ment. Any statement or intimation by the court to the jury that
such recommendation will be favorably considered in regard to
the fixing of the punishment is fatal error. The reason is that
a statement or an intimation by the court to the effect that such
recommendations might alter the penalty or mitigate the punish-
ment will influence the verdict, particularly in a doubtfUl: lease.
While it is the duty of the court to instruct the jury upon: the
law of the case, it should not in any manner attempt to influence
its deliberations.
In the case of State v. Doucet,7s the jury, after deliberating
for some hours without agreeing on a verdict, asked if they had
the power to recommend mercy. The trial judge told them that
they might recommend mercy if they saw fit but that such rec-
ommendation might, within his discretion, be disregarded. This,
said the Supreme Court, was correct and there would have been
no error if he had stopped there. But the trial judge went fur-
ther and said, "But the court always gives great weight .to the
recommendations of the trial jury." Holding that the verdict
must be set aside, the Supreme Court said:
"[I]f the court by any remark or intimation leads the
jury to believe that, by incorporating in their verdict a rec-
ommendation to mercy, the punishment will be reduced, their
verdict is thereby rendered invalid .... We think the remarks
made by the judge in this case were well calculated to and
probably did influence the jury in rendering its verdict.
"The function of the jury is to pass upon the guilt or in-
75. The statute which provides that the court may suspend sentence on. the
recommendation of the jury in certain cases was held not to make it mandatory
on the trial judge to follow the recommendation but merely to place it within- his
discretion to do so or not. State v. Evans, 159 La. 712, 106 So. 123 (1925) ; see
Act 74 of 1914, as superseded by LA. R.S. 15:530 (1950).
76. 177 La. 63, 147 So. 500 (1933).
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nocence of the accused. That is what they are sworn to do
and what they are instructed to do. Presumably they do their
duty. But it is no reflection upon the personnel of any jury
to say that they may be influenced in their findings, to some
extent at least, by a consideration of the penalty or punish-
ment which may follow their verdict. An intelligent citizen,
and a perfectly honest and conscientious one, serving as a
juror, might be willing to convict an accused for stealing a
pig if such conviction carried with it punishment by impris-
onment in jail for 60 days. But, if he knew that the convic-
tion carried with it the death penalty or imprisonment for life,
he would hardly be willing to pronounce the defendant guilty,
even though the facts and the law warranted such verdict. It
is a matter of common knowledge that the severity of the
penalty deters prosecutions and convictions in some in-
stances. Neither jurors nor judges willing convict if, in their
opinion, the punishment which necessarily follows is out of
all proportion to the wrong done." '77
The court continued:
"The eminence of the trial judge in this case, his devotion
to duty, and his well-known habits of fairness in the trial of
criminal cases preclude all thought that he intended by the
remark made to influence the jury in its deliberations. But
his remarks were virtually an assurance that the jury could,
by incorporating in their verdict a recommendation to mercy,
reduce the penalty or in some way mitigate the punishment.
It is so highly probable that such remark influenced the jury
to the prejudice of the rights of the accused that we cannot
sanction the proceeding."78
The decision, however, was made by a bare majority of the
court. In the dissenting opinion, it was said:
"The remark of the court 'that it always gave great
weight to the recommendations of the jury' should not be
given the effect of annulling the verdict. The remark did
not involve a comment on any fact pertaining to the guilt
or innocence of the accused. This is apparently conceded.
It did not involve a promise on the part of the judge, or even
an intimation by him, that, if the jury recommended mercy,
the court, in this particular case, would show mercy in pro-
7. 177 La. 63, 68-69, 147 So. 500, 502 (1933).
78. 177 La. 63, 70, 147 So. 500, 502 (1933).
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nouncing sentence. All that the jury were told is that the
court always gave great weight to the recommendations of
juries.
"Since juries are permitted in this state to make recom-
mendations, it is the manifest duty of judges to give such
weight to their recommendations, that is to say, not to treat
their suggestions of mercy with indifference, but to give
weight to them, namely, to give their recommendations care-
ful consideration before pronouncing sentence. This is all
that the words of the judge conveyed to the jury." 9
In capital cases, the jury is expressly permitted by statute
to qualify their verdict so as to remit the death penalty to life
imprisonment.8 0 The reason for the statute is that, with death
as the sole and mandatory punishment, the jury is faced with
the choice of condemning to death a man for whom it would
like to show some clemency or, on the other hand, of letting him
go completely unpunished. A comment by the court, however,
that the life imprisonment sentence can be reduced by parole
or pardon would probably constitute reversible error in Lou-
isiana. In a Georgia case,"' the jury requested the court to
advise them as to the probability of the defendant serving a
full life sentence without parole, if they returned a guilty ver-
dict with recommendation of mercy. By statute in Georgia,8 2
as in Louisiana, a verdict of guilty, with a recommendation of
mercy, in a capital case of homicide means imprisonment for
life. The court informed the jury that the parole board could
release a person under a life sentence after seven years of im-
prisonment. A guilty verdict without recommendation was re-
turned and the defendant was sentenced to death. The appellate
court, reversing the case, held that the instruction was prejudi-
cial and operated to influence the jury against a recommendation
of mercy.8 3
It is clearly error for the judge or the district attorney to
say to the jury, "The entire country is looking at the result of
this case," or, "This town needs a few hangings," or, "We can't
79. 177 La. 63, 74-75, 147 So. 500, 504 (1933). See Note, 73 U.S. L. REV.
421 (1939).
80. See LA. R.S. 15:409 (1950), supra note 73.
81. Strickland v. State, 209 Ga. 65, 70 S.E.2d 710 (1952).
82. GA. CODE ANN. § 26-1005 (1951).
83. Some courts hold that an instruction by the trial judge that a life im-
prisonment sentence can be reduced by parole or pardon, though improper, is not
reversible error. State v. Carroll, 52 Wyo. 29, 69 P.2d 542 (1937).
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have law enforcement unless we have a conviction." It is error
because a decision on guilt or innocence is invited on a basis
which is not directly involved in the case. But is the potential
punishment or treatment of the defendant similarly irrelevant?
Strictly speaking, it is irrelevant to a jury which is concerned
only with the question of whether the defendant committed the
act, but nonetheless it may be desirable to permit comment on
post-conviction treatment.
Punishment and rehabilitation are aspects of contemporary
penal theory. If punishment is the goal of a sentence, it is true
to say that a sentencing body cannot intelligently impose a sen-
tence without full knowledge of the quantum of punishment
ultimately involved in a particular sentence.8 4 A jury which
is given the power to extend mercy is a sentencing body.
When rehabilitation is the desideratum, it might be suggested
that a different situation is presented. The jury, and the judge
also for that matter,8 5 are not directly involved in the rehabilita-
84. It would seem not only proper, but also advisable, to instruct the jury
concerning the consequences of the sentence. It has been said that the jury should
not have to speculate on such matters as the effect of parole or pardon. In any
event, information concerning the effect of parole or pardon upon the sentence
should come from the trial judge at the time of his charge, inasmuch as comment
by the prosecutor gives it undue importance in the jury's mind. The prosecuting
attorney is generally not permitted to mention the possibility of parole or pardon
in addressing the jury. See State v. Johnson, 151 La. 625, 92 So. 139 (1922).
Contra: Glenday v. Commonwealth, 255 Ky. 313, 74 S.W.2d 332 (1934).
85. "It is many times said that the sentencing of a criminal is solely a judicial
function. Some judges resent the thought that lay persons, even those trained in
penology and sociology, should share the responsibility of determining the length
of sentence. The plain truth of the matter is, however, that while the actual sen-
tencing of a criminal is properly the judge's job, it cannot logically be said that
determining the exact length of that sentence cannot be done better in most cases
by trained parole officers, who after sentencing, and in the light of the prisoner's
rapidity of rehabilitation, are able to determine a proper and logical time to
release him. The foresight of the judge is not as good as the hindsight of the
Parole Board members." Devitt, Improvements in Federal Sentencing Procedures,
24 F.R.D. 147 (1959). Justice Frankfurter says: "I, myself, think that the bench
- we lawyers who become judges-are not very competent, are not qualified by
experience, to impose sentences where any discretion is to be exercised. I do not
think it is in the domain of the training of lawyers to know what to do with a
fellow after you find out he is a thief. I do not think legal training gives you any
special competence. I, myself, hope that one of these days, and before long, we
will divide the functions of criminal justice. I think the lawyers are the people
who are competent to ascertain whether or not a crime has been committed. The
whole scheme of common law judicial machinery - the rules of evidence, the
ascertainment of what is relevant and what is irrelevant and what is fair, the
whole question of whether you can introduce prior crimes in order to prove intent
- I think lawyers are peculiarly fitted fbr that task. But all of the questions that
follow upon ascertainment of guilt, I think require very different and much more
diversified talents than the lawyers and judges are normally likely to possess."
Statement of Justice Frankfurter in Wisdom, THE MAGAZINE OF KNOWLEDGE AND
EDUCATrON, 28th Issue, Beverly Hills, Calif. See also Note, 91 U. PA. L. REV.
221 (1941).
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tion program of the defendant. Once the defendant leaves the
courtroom the jurors never see him again and they are unaware
of his progress in rehabilitation. Having given their verdict, the
jurors sink into obscurity. Nonetheless, the jury might well be
told of the purposes of modern corrective devices. One reason
for unjustified acquittals is the repugnance many people feel in
handing over a person to be punished, especially when they dis-
approve or misconceive the nature of penal treatment. It is
always a good thing for a person to know the consequences of
his decision, and when jurors are told of the possibility of parole
or pardon, or the lack of its possibility, they are not being
asked to convict or acquit regardless of the evidence. It has
been suggested that a distinction, at least, should be drawn be-
tween information volunteered in the charge and information
responsive to a query.
VIII. DISCHARGE OF THE JURY BEFORE VERDICT
In the early common law a jury, once impaneled and sworn,
could not be discharged without first rendering a verdict. A
breach of this rule was tantamount to an acquittal. It was no
excuse that the jury could not agree on a verdict. A trial, once
begun, had to end in a verdict. Jurors were, therefore, deprived
of "meat, or drink, or candle, or rest of any kind" in order to
persuade them to reach a decision.
The need for coercing a jury to a verdict no longer exists.
A judge under certain circumstances (such as a disagreement,
illness, or misconduct of one of the jurors) may now discharge
a jury without barring a future trial of the accused on the same
charges.8 6 A judge who now coerces a jury to a verdict is guilty
of misconduct. If the jury says that they cannot agree, the
judge may impress upon them the importance of arriving at
an agreement if they honestly can do so, but he cannot persuade
the jury to arrive at a verdict by saying that he will not accept
a mistrial and that the jury must renew their deliberations.
A discharge of the jury without cause will bar, under the
double jeopardy provision of the Constitution, a future trial of
the defendant on the same charges. Jeopardy attaches'w'hen a
jury has been impaneled and sworn, and an unjustifiable dis-
86: See Slovenko, The Law on Double Jeopardy, 30 TULANE L; Rav. 409
i(1956). On ,behavior of jury during trial, see Slovenko, The Jury System in Lou-
isiana eriminal Law, 17 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 655, 722 (1957). ' . . I
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charge before verdict operates in law as an acquittal. The fact
that jurors find it impossible to agree upon a verdict is a legiti-
mate reason for discharging the jury. The consent of the de-
fendant to the jury's discharge is not necessary. Of course, a
jury which is discharged because of an inability to agree must
have had a reasonable time in which to deliberate, otherwise
the discharge will count as an acquittal.
IX. CONCURRENCE NEEDED IN VERDICT
Trial by jury as used in the Sixth and Seventh Amendments
to the Federal Constitution means trial by jury as it existed at
the common law at the time of the separation of the American
colonies from England, which was trial by a jury of twelve re-
quiring a unanimous verdict.s 7 In early history jurors were
men drawn from the neighborhood who were assumed to have
knowledge of all the revelant facts and were bound upon their
oath and according to their knowledge to answer the question of
guilty or innocent.88 The device of the oath, whereby spiritual
forces were made to perform a temporal service, was a strong
guarantor of veracity, and as the men who were compelled so
to answer were the men who must know the "truth" about a
matter, there was no doubt that the answer could only be
unanimous.8 9 However, in criminal matters, when in the year
1352 the witnesses were translated into judges, the unanimity
rule remained even though the reason and significance of the
rule had vanished. 90 Unanimity is still demanded from a jury
in England and in the federal courts in this country.
The Sixth and Seventh Amendments to the Federal Con-
stitution govern only the federal courts and do not apply to
jury trials within the states ;91 and it has even been held that
trial by jury may be abolished by the states without contraven-
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution. 92
87. See Anonymous, Lib. Ass. 253, pl. 11 (C.B. 1367) ; Dimick v. Schiedt, 293
U.S. 474 (1935) ; Hibdon v. United States, 204 F.2d 834 (6th Cir. 1953) ; Wein-
stein, Trial by Jury and Unanimous Verdicts, 69 U.S. L. REV. 513 (1935).
88. In criminal matters, until 1352, the jurors who formed the jury of trial
were on the grand jury, or the jury of presentment. The jury were judges and
witnesses together.
89. See DEVLIN, op. cit. supra note 1 at 6.
90. See id. at 48.
91. See Andres v. United States, 333 U.S. 740 (1948) ; State v. Harvey, 159
La. 674, 106 So. 28 (1925) ; State v. Haddad, 142 La. 69, 76 So. 243 (1917).
92. Synder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1934). Mr. Justice Peckham in
Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 603 (1900) said: "Trial by jury has never been
affirmed to be a necessary requisite of due process of law."
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Since the states are free to define as it will its system of trial by
jury,93 a state provision which permits non-unanimous verdicts
is generally conceded not to be a violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Expediency and analogy are against the common law prac-
tice of requiring unanimous verdicts. It is difficult for twelve
men to agree on any question, particularly if they come from
diversified elements of the population. In political and social
matters we accept the view that the voice of the majority binds
the community. On the other hand, it is arguable that the
unanimity of a verdict is inextricably interwoven with the meas-
ure of proof required in a criminal case.95 To sustain the validity
of a verdict by less than all of the jurors might destroy the
test of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, for it might be said
that a verdict is not supported by proof beyond a reasonable
doubt when some of the jurors remain reasonably in doubt. The
prosecution has an easier task in persuading a majority of the
jurors than all of them. A minority veto does insure more care-
ful deliberation. Setting the number of jurors at twelve is per-
haps arbitrary, 96 and the accused may be adequately served by
a jury somewhat less in number or by a greater number of
jurors, 9 7 but the common law requirement of a unanimous ver-
dict may perhaps be considered as an inescapable element of
due process.98
The unanimity rule clearly has virtue in the case of dis-
agreement in the jury between two more or less evenly balanced
93. Under a state constitution guaranteeing jury trial, the common law defi-
nition controls unless the state constitution defines it otherwise. See State v.
Jutila, 34 Idaho 595, 202 Pac. 566 (1921).
94. "Our ancestors insisted on unanimity as of the essence of the verdict, but
were unscrupulous how that unanimity was obtained." Cockburn, C.J., in Winsor
v. Regina, 6 Best and S. 141, 171 (1866). See also supra note 3 (under Magna
Charta a person was tried by men of his own class).
95. See Hibdon v. United States, 204 F.2d 834 (6th Cir. 1953), noted in 67
HARv. L. REv. 897 (1954), 52 MIcH. L. REv. 911 (1954), 21 U. Cni. L. REv.
438 (1954).
96."Many romantic explanations have been offered of the number twelve-the
twelve tribes of Israel, the twelve patriarchs, and the twelve officers of Solomon
recorded in the Book of Kings, and the twelve Apostles. Not all of these sug-
gestions are equally happy; the first implies that there may be a thirteenth juror
who has got lost somewhere in the corridor and the last that there is a Judas on
every jury. It is clear that what was wanted was a number that was large enough
to create a formidable body of opinion in favour of the side that won; and doubt-
less the reason for having twelve instead of ten, eleven or thirteen was much the
same as gives twelve pennies to the shilling and which exhibits an early English
abhorrence of the decimal system." DEvLi, TRIAL BY JURY 8 (1956).
97. See Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581 (1900).
98. See 8upra note 95.
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views. A dissenting minority of a third or a quarter suggests
the existence of a reasonable doubt. However, a majority of
eleven out of twelve would in all likelihood show that the case
was established beyond a reasonable doubt and that the disagree-
ment was probably caused by the aberration of an eccentric who
delights in disagreeing simply for the sake of disagreement. 99
Modifications of the unanimity rule have been introduced
in many of the American states. In Louisiana, verdict is per-
mitted in certain cases to be found by less than the entire number
of jurors. 0 0 In capital cases a unanimous verdict of a twelve-
man jury is required for the finding of any verdict. 1 1 In other
serious felony cases, where the felony is necessarily punishable
with imprisonment at hard labor, a twelve-man jury is required,
but only nine of the jurors need concur for the finding of any
verdict. 10 2 In quasi-felony cases, where the felony is punishable
with imprisonment with or without hard labor, a five-man
unanimous jury is necessary for the finding of any verdict.1 3
The Louisiana State Law Institute in its project for a new
Constitution proposed that the quasi-felony be tried by a seven-
man jury with five out of seven concurring in the verdict ren-
dered. The abolition of the five-man jury was urged as the
requirement of unanimity makes difficult the finding of a ver-
dict. Inasmuch as a nine-out-of-twelve concurrence suffices for
a verdict in a case involving a serious felony, a similar pro-
portionate verdict would seem to be adequate in the lesser crimes.
The suggestion of the Institute met with some disapproval in
99. Sir Patrick Devlin, however, says: "[T]he fact is, I believe, that the ec-
centrics do not turn up often enough and so the demand for reform is not strong
en6ugh. to defeat the faith reposed in traditional and well-tried methods. The evil
caused by disagreements is not great. When they occur, they can sometimes be
grievous to the parties concerned and they are always expensive, but they are not
numerous enough to create a general problem. The sense of satisfaction obtainable
from complete unanimity is itself a valuable thing and it would be sacrificed if
even one dissentient were overruled. Since no one really knows how the jury
works or indeed can satisfactorily explain to a theorist why it works at all, it is
w!ise not to tamper with it until the need for alteration is shown to be overwhelm-
ing." 'DEVLIN, TRIAL BY JURY 57 (1956).
100. See La. Const. art. VII, §§ 41-42 (1921) ; LA. R.S. 15:337-342 (1950).
1O:. LA. R.S. 15:337 (1950). The defendant is not permitted to plead guilty
or waive a jury trial in a capital case. See id. 15:259, 262. Livingston recom-
mendedthqt trial by jury "be the mode of trial for all offences, and it cannot be
renounced." S..ee LIVINGSTON, REPORT ON A PENAL CODE OF THE STATE OF LOU-
ISIANA 121 (1822).
102. The defendant cannot waive trial by jury in cases which are capital, or
necessarily punishable with imprisonment at hard labor. LA. R.S. 15:259 (1950).
109. The" quasi-felony cases may be tried by the judge alone, the jury being
waivable. The' misdemeanor cases, that is to say, cases in which imprisonment
with hard labor cannot be imposed, are tried by the judge without intervention of
jury, without any option to the defendant.
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the small parishes due to the inconvenience and cost of securing
seven-man juries for quasi-felony cases. It has been suggested
that the present five-man jury be retained, but with a four-obt-
of-five concurrence sufficient for the finding of a verdict. 10 4
X. FORM OF VERDICT
The jury, in effect, simply says yes or no. The intellectual
process of the jury is left in the dark. The jury gives no reasons
for its decision. This characteristic of the jury may be explained
partly on historical grounds. The jury was in its origin as
oracular as the ordeal; the verdict, no more than the result of
the ordeal, was open to rational criticism.10 Professor Pluckniett
has written that in the Middle Ages "the court treated the jury
as it did the hot iron or the cold water, or as one would treat a
spinning coin; it put the simple question and got a short an-
swer- 'guilty' or 'not guilty'. How that short answer was
reached one did not enquire; like the ordeal the jury was in-
scrutable."'1o
The jury today is similarly not allowed to expand upon its
verdict and its reasons may not be inquired into, lest the secrecy,
of the juryroom be violated. It is presumed that twelve, men,
good and true, who have reached a decision after deliberation
must have had reasons for their conclusion. The reasons of the
jurors for their verdict may not be the same, but nonetheless
their conclusion is presumably not arbitrary.10 7
104. See Bennett, Blind Spots in the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure,
1 LA. BAR J. 62, 71 (April 1954). Section 355 of the A.L.I. Model Code of Crim-
inal Procedure recommends: "In capital cases no verdict may be rendered unless
all the jurors concur in it. In other cases of felony a verdict concurred in by five-
sixths of the jurors, and in cases of misdemeanor a verdict concurred in'by two-
thirds of the jurors may be rendered."
105. See DEVLIN, op. cit. supra note 1, at 14.
106. Quoted in WILLIAMS, THE PROOF OF GUILT 243 (1955).
107. Some persons consider that the presumption is naive. In Verdict of
Twelve, Mr. Raymond Postgate expresses the view that jurors reach their verdict
for rbasons that have little relation to the evidence given. See WILLIAMS, THE
PROOF OF GUILT 203 (1955). There is an absence of information on the working
of the jury. In May 1954, faculty members of the University of Chicago Law
School secretly installed microphones in the juryroom of the Tenth Federal Cir-
cuit Court in Wichita, Kansas, and made recordings of the jurors' deliberations in
five civil cases. It was approved by the presiding judge and the attorneys con-
cerned with the cases. The recordings were altered in such a way that no. identi-
fication of the jurors would be possible. A few persons praised the idea as a val-
uable contribution to understanding the jury system, but neither the Departmbnt
of Justice nor Internal Security Sub-Committee of the Senate accepted this view.
Public opinion supported the condemnation of the project. Attorney. 'General
Brownell stated that strict privacy of a jury's deliberations was at the very basis
of due process of law. Until juries are certain that the experiment cannot be
repeated, it was said, their thinking and free discussion might be cramped. The
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The jury is required to report with a verdict which is re-
sponsive to the accusation and which is correct in form. 08 The
trial judge is prohibited from receiving and recording a verdict
either irresponsive to the accusation or incorrect in form.10 9 The
judge can remedy a defective verdict by remanding the jury
with oral instructions as to permissible verdicts and as to cor-
rect form. 110
A. Verdict Must Be Responsive to Accusation
Responsiveness requires that the jury return with a verdict
of guilty or not guilty of the offense charged in the accusation,
or of an offense included within the accusation, as delimited
by Article 386 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Article 386,
as amended in 1948, substantially reduced the number of "lesser-
included offenses" which are responsive to a indictment."' This
was done in order to minimize the danger of confusing the
jury with numerous charges, and to achieve certainty in the law
of responsive verdicts."12 The verdicts which may be rendered in
cases involving accusations enumerated in Article 386 are speci-
fied therein. The judge in all cases, after charging the jury,
must now furnish the jury with a written list of the verdicts
responsive to the crime charged, with each of those responsive
Verdicts separately and fully stated. 118  This requirement has
reasoning is circular. The purpose of the project was to determine whether the
jury was thinking about and discussing the case in the juryroom. But it is gen-
erally admitted that jurors are not scientific investigators. See Walls Have Ears,
177 ECONOMIST 302 (Oct. 22, 1955); see also FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 116
(1949).
108. See LA. R.S. 15:400, 402 (1950). See generally id. 15:398-421. The code
provisions regulating the form and effect of verdicts apply equally to the findings
by the judge upon pleas tried by him without a jury. Id. 15:420.
109. See id. 15:402; State v. Hodge, 173 La. 128, 136 So. 291 (1931).
110. See LA. R.S. 15:400-402 (1950).
111. By definition, a verdict of a lesser offense is responsive when all of the
elements of the lesser offense are included in the charge of the greater offense,
which necessarily contains additional elements. The reason underlying the rule
that the verdict of a lesser offense be responsive is to meet the constitutional re-
quirement of informing an accused of the nature and cause of the accusation. See
State v. Poe, 214 La. 606, 617, 38 So.2d 359, 362 (1949).
112. See Notes, 9 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 41, 576 (1948-49). In the cases
prior to 1948 it was necessary to decide whether a particular crime was "neces-
sarily included" in, and therefore responsive to the offense for which the accused
was indicted. See State v. Poe, 214 La. 606, 38 So.2d 359 (1949) : "If any rea-
sonable state of facts can be imagined wherein the greater offense is committed
without perpetrating the lesser offense, a verdict for the lesser cannot be re-
sponsive." A.L.I. CODE OF CRM. PROC. § 348 provides: "Upon an indictment or
information for any offense the jurors may convict the defendant of an attempt
to commit such offense, if such attempt is an offense, or convict him of any offense
which is necessarily included in the offense charged."
113. The list is taken into the juryroom for use by the jury during its delib-
eration. LA. R.S. 15:386.1 (1950).
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virtually eliminated the chance of a confused and nonresponsive
verdict.
In cases in which a capital offense is charged, a unanimous
decision is required of the jury to find the defendant guilty
even of a lesser responsive grade of the offense. The number of
jurors to try a case is determined by the gravity or nature of
the crime charged, and not by the verdict returned.114 Thus, if
the charge is murder, then a verdict of manslaughter, which
could normally be returned by a nine-out-of-twelve decision, must
also be unanimous. However, since a unanimous verdict is con-
sidered essential only in crimes carrying capital punishment,
it would appear appropriate to permit included verdicts of lesser
crimes by a nine-out-of-twelve vote, in order to avoid an un-
necessary number of "hung juries" with resulting mistrials. 115
B. General Verdicts and Special Verdicts
Verdicts are of two kinds, general and special. A general
verdict in a criminal case is one of "guilty" or "not guilty," and
in a civil case it is a verdict for the plaintiff or for the defend-
ant, and if for the plaintiff, for an amount in damages. A
special verdict is one where separate issues of fact are left for
the jury's determination by means of a series of questions which
they answer according to their findings. When a civil jury re-
turns a special verdict, judgment is entered in accordance with
its findings. 116 When a criminal jury returns a special verdict,
114. See State v. Iseringhausen, 204 La. 593, 16 So.2d 65 (1943); State v.
Stanford, 204 La. 439, 15 So.2d 817 (1943).
115. See Bennett, Blind Spots in the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure,
1 LA. BAR J. 62, 71 (April 1954).
116. The general verdict and the special verdict both have defects and both
have been subjected to criticism. In a general verdict the jury draws the legal
conclusions from the facts and states whether the defendant is guilty or not guilty.
Three elements enter into the general verdict: finding of the facts, the law, and the
application of the law to the facts. And the general verdict is liable to three
sources of error, corresponding to the three elements. If error occurs in any of
these matters, it cannot be discovered, for the jurors will not be heard to say what
facts were found, or what principles of law were applied, or how the application
of the law to the facts were made. No analysis of the verdict can be made which
will throw light on the process. By the device of the special verdict, the jury is
retained as a finder of facts, but is relieved of the duty of applying the law to
the facts. The special verdict thereby avoids the danger of the jury applying the
law in a wholly wrong way, or of failing to apply it at all. The requirement in
a special verdict that the jury find unequivocally and explicitly all of the material
facts that might warrant the court in adjudging the guilt or innocence of the de-
fendant has caused difficulty. A special verdict is defective if a material finding
is omitted, if the findings are contradictory, or if the findings are merely a state-
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the judge reserves the right to require the jury subsequently to
give a general verdict, guilty or not guilty, on the basis of the
facts it has found.117
By taking a special verdict, the judge controls a jury from
giving a sentimental acquittal and from disregarding his di-
rection in point of law, but the weapon is rarely used. 118 It has
been recognized to be the better practice to leave criminal guilt
to the jury in general terms.119 It is felt that the special verdict
in criminal cases impairs the freedom and independence of the
jury.120 Louisiana by statute in 1928 forbade the finding of a
special verdict in criminal cases. Article 408 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure provides that "the jury may find no other
verdict than one of not guilty or one of guilty of some offense
contained in the indictment.' 2 1 It is interesting to note that
Scotland has the verdict of "not proven," which is used when
the prosecutor has not established the guilt of the defendant
beyond a reasonable doubt but when there is doubt as to his
innocence. There is a good deal to be said for the verdict of
"not proven" as a supplement to the verdicts of "guilty" and
"not guilty." It does not entail placing the onus of proof on
the defense.
C. Verdict Must Not Be Ambiguous
The verdict of the jury is a step in the trial of a case that
cannot be left to conjecture. The verdict must be in such form
that the judgment and sentence will not be a matter of guess-
work on the part of the court. Courts dealing with life and lib-
erty, as well as with damages in civil cases, have no right to
dispense with what might be termed speculative, or "bucket
shop," justice. The verdict, whether returned orally or in
writing, must be expressed in such plain and intelligible words
that its meaning may be understood readily by the judge. 1 22
ment of the evidence. See State v. Gulledge, 207 N.C. 374, 177 S.E. 128 (1934),
noted in 13 N.C.L. REV. 321 (1935) ; Green, Blindfolding the Jury, 33 TEXAS L.
REV. 157, 273 (1954-55) ; Green, A New Development in Jury Trial, 13 A.B.A.J.
715 (1927) ; Sunderland, Verdicts, General and Special, 29 YALE L.J. 253 (1920)
Note, 12 TEXAS L. REV. 327 (1934).
117. See DEVLIN, op. cit. supra note 1, at 89.
118. See WILLIAMS, THE PROOF OF GUILT 201 (1955).
119. See id. at 203.
120. See DEVLIN, op. cit. supra note 1 at 88-89.
121. LA. R.S. 15:408 (1950). Prior to the 1928 Code, the Louisiana Supreme
Court allowed the jury to render a special verdict. See State v. Washington, 107
La. 298, 31 So. 638 (1901) ; State v. French, 50 La. Ann. 461, 23 So. 606 (1898) ;
State v. Burdon, 38 La. Ann. 357 (1886) ; State v. Ritchie, 3 La. Ann. 511
(1848). Contra: State v. Jurche, 17 La. Ann. 71 (1865).
122. See State v. Broadnax, 216 La. 1003, 45 So.2d 604 (1950).
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The foregoing is not unmindful of the court's ruling that
verdicts are to be construed liberally. Although the verdict is
to be liberally construed, the court must be able to determine
with certainty the jury's intended decision. A verdict, however,
will not be held void by the appellate court for uncertainty when
its meaning can be determined by reference to the evidence or to
the record. In State v. Broadnax,'123 in which the defendant was
charged with the wilful and unlawful possession of narcotic
drugs in violation of the Narcotic Drug Act, the jury returned
a written verdict of "guilty of attempted possession." The de-
fendant contended that the verdict returned by the jury is a
legal nullity, as the verdict "guilty of attempted possession" is
meaningless, there being no such crime known to the laws of
this state. Taken by itself, the verdict is meaningless. However,
the verdict was construed with reference to the charge stated
in the information, and it was reasonably certain that the jury
intended to find the defendant guilty of attempted unlawful
possession of narcotics. The language of the verdict, being that
of "lay people," need not follow the strict rules of pleading or
be otherwise technical. Whatever conveys the idea to the com-
mon understanding will suffice. And all fair intendments will
be made to support it. Any words which convey beyond a rea-
sonable doubt the meaning and intention of the jury to return
a verdict of guilty or not guilty of the offense charged are suf-
ficient.12
4
In Louisiana there is no statutory form for the verdict of the
jury, although certain verdicts have been made responsive to
certain charges. In the absence of any such statutory form,
what is meant by the words "correct or proper in form" in the
Code of Criminal Procedure is that the language used by the
jury in returning the verdict should disclose the intention of the
jury with reasonable certainty.125 If any uncertainty exists in
the language actually used, the first object of the appellate court
in construing the verdict is to ascertain with reasonable cer-
tainty the intention of the jury, which intent may be ascertained
or arrived at by reference to anything in the proceeding that
serves to show with certainty what the jury intended. 26
123. 216 La. 1003, 45 So.2d 604 (1950).
124. See 1 BISHOP, CRIMINAL PROCEDURe. 636, § 1005a (4th ed. 1895) ; 53 AM.
JUR. Trial, § 1036, p. 716; 23 C.J.S. Criminal Law, § 1398, p. 1077.
125. See State v. Broadnax, 216 La. 1003, 45 So.2d 604 (1950) ; State v.
Ritchie, 172 La. 942, 136 So. 11 (1931).
126. A verdict of guilty which does not name the offense will be taken to
1960]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. XX
D. Verdict Must Be Consistent
Consistency is essential to the return of a valid verdict. 27
Thus, one accused in different counts of the same crime, there
being no difference in the means alleged to have been employed,
may not be deemed by the jury to be guilty on one count and not
guilty on the other.1 28 The rule against inconsistency is based
on the premise that the jury must have made a mistake.
A verdict of guilty, without specification, means that all the
defendants on trial are guilty as charged in each count of the
accusation. 29 A verdict of guilty, without specification, to an
accusation which charges in separate counts higher and lower
grades of the same offense, means guilty of the highest grade of
the offense charged in the indictment.180 A finding of guilty of
a lesser offense is automatically a finding of not guilty as to
the main offense.131 A verdict of not guilty means that none of
the defendants on trial is guilty of any offense charged in any
count of the indictment.1'32 A verdict which designates upon
which count or counts any defendant is found guilty, and does
not rule on the other counts, means that he is not guilty upon
the counts. 33
E. Poll of the Jury
A poll of the jury verifies their vote. The judge, upon the
mean guilty of the offense charged. See Note, 18 TEXAS L. REV. 505 (1940) ; see
also State v. Anderson, 45 La. Ann. 651, 12 So. 737 (1893).
127. See State v. Mansfield, 178 La. 393, 151 So. 631 (1933) ; State v. Thomp-
son, 13 La. Ann. 515 (1858) ; 2 BisHop, NEW CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 1015a (4th
ed. 1895).
128. But see Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390 (1932), noted in 23 J. CRIm.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 489 (1932). In this federal case the defendant was charged
with violation of the national Prohibition Act in three counts: (1) for maintain-
ing a common nuisance by keeping for sale at a specified place intoxicating liquor;
(2) for unlawful possession of intoxicating liquor; and (3) for unlawful safe of
such liquor. The jury returned a verdict of guilty on the first count but not guilty
on the other two counts. The defendant appealed on the ground of inconsistency
in the verdict. A divided Supreme Court held, contrary to general rule, that con-
sistency in a verdict is not necessary, as each count in an indictment is regarded
as if it were a separate indictment. Mr. Justice Butler, dissenting, stated that
when, upon an indictment charging the same offense in different counts, the jury
acquits as to one and convicts as to the other, defendant is entitled to a new trial.
129. LA. R.S. 15:411 (1950). When it is the intention of the jury to return
different findings as to several defendants on trial, the verdict must name each
defendant and the finding as, to him. Id. 15:414.
130. Id. 15:413.
131. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957), noted in 32 TuL. L. REV.
488 (1958) ; State v. Dabon, 162 La. 1075, 111 So. 461 (1927) ; State v. Vial,
153 La. 883, 96 So. 796 (1923); State v. Stanley, 42 La. Ann. 978, 8 So. 469
(1890).
132. LA. R.S. 15:412 (1950). See also WEIHOFEN, INSANITY AS A DEFENSE
IN CRIMINAL LAW 262 (1933).
133. LA. R.S. 15:411 (1950).
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request either of the prosecution or of the defense, is required
to poll the jury before they are discharged. 18 4 The court, how-
ever, need not poll the jury except when requested to do so
by the state or the defendant.1 35 Polling the jury'8 6 consists in
the clerk's calling each juror, one at a time, by name, announcing
to him the verdict that has been returned, and asking him, "Is
that your verdict?' 1 3 7 If the number required by law for the
finding of a verdict answer in the affirmative, the jury is dis-
charged, otherwise it is remanded for further deliberation. 1 8
Once the jury has been discharged, it is too late for a juror
to say that he did not assent to the verdict. 8 9 After the verdict
has been rendered, and the jury discharged from the case, they
cannot be reimpaneled and, under further instructions, be called
upon to reconsider their verdict. 14 0 Such a procedure might lead
to dangerous consequences.
XI. DIREcTED VERDICT
The judge in a criminal case under the common law cannot
make the verdict for the jury. Under the common law, in a civil
trial, the case can be withdrawn from the jury when the evi-
dence is clearly in favor of a party; in a criminal case, however,
the judge must leave the case to the jury. The judge cannot
direct a verdict of guilty or refuse to accept a verdict of not
guilty if returned, even though the judge considers that the only
possible inference to be drawn from the evidence is the guilt of
the defendant. In the situation where the prosecution has not
made out a case against the defendant, the judge cannot take the
case from the jury, but he need not enter judgment or pass
sentence upon an unsupportable verdict of guilty.'4 ' There is
another way of dealing with an unsupportable verdict of guilty,
and that is by an appeal by the defendant from the conviction,
which has always been allowed the defendant in America and
since 1908 in England.
134. Id. 15:416. See Commonwealth & Lemley, 158 Pa. Super. 125, 44 A.2d
317 (1945) (polling of jury after a sealed verdict has been offered).
135. State v. Johnson, 171 La. 95, 129 So. 684 (1930) ; State v. Colomb, 108
La. 253, 32 So. 351 (1902).
136. LA. R.S. 15:417 (1950).
137. See State v. Gogain, 12 La. Ann. 264 (1857).
138. LA. R.S. 15:417 (1950). See State v. Johnson, 141 La. 775, 75 So. 678
(1917).
139. See Mercer v. State, 17 Ga. 146 (1855).
140. See State v. Dawkins, 32 S.C. 17, 10 S.E. 772 (1890).
141. See DEVLIN, op. Cit. supra note 1 at 80.
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A. Direction of Guilty
The judge, as stated, may never formally direct a jury to
return a verdict of guilty, even when the incriminating evidence
is highly convincing and uncontradicted. 142 The judge is without
power to direct a verdict of guilty although no fact is in dis-
pute. 43 In some states the judge may comment or express an
opinion on the evidence, but he cannot direct a verdict of guilty.
In these states the judge may "enlighten" the understanding of
the jury and thereby influence their judgment; but he may not
use undue influence. In these states he may advise; he may per-
suade; but he may not command or coerce.
A direction of a verdict of guilty would deprive the defend-
ant of his right to a trial by jury.144 Lord Chancellor Sankey
said that for the judge to say that the jury must in law find
the prisoner guilty would be to make him "decide the case and
not the jury, which is not the common law."' 45 And as it was
recently said in a debate in the House of Lords, no one has ever
yet been able to find a way of depriving a British jury of its
privilege of returning a perverse verdict.146 Since the double
jeopardy provision of the Constitution prevents the court from
setting aside a verdict of acquittal and ordering the retrial of a
case, power of the court to direct a verdict of guilty would, in
effect, allow it to do indirectly what it has no power to do di-
rectly.
B. Direction of Not Guilty
A number of American states take the position that the
trial judge can and, indeed, must direct a verdict of acquittal
when there is no substantial evidence of the guilt of the ac-
cused.147 It is the right and the duty of the trial judge, in these
142. The trier of fact is not compelled to believe any witness merely because
his testimony is uncontradicted.
143. It is generally held that a direction of a verdict of guilty deprives the
defendant of his constitutional right to a trial by jury. See People v. Clark, 295
Mich. 704, 295 N.W. 370 (1940), noted in 39 MIcH. L. REV. 1234 (1941). See
also Note, 19 MICH. L. REV. 325 (1921).
144. See Note, 39 MICH. L. REV. 1234 (1941). See also Note, 19 Micr. L. REV.
325 (1921) (power of jury to render a verdict against the law and the evidence).
145. Woolmington v. D. P. P., [1935] A.C. 462, 480.
146. The Times, February 16, 1955, quoted in DEVLIN, op. cit. supra note 1,
at 84.
147. See cases collected in Note, 17 A.LR. 910. Cf. Sparf and Hansen v.
United States, 156 U.S. 51 (1895). Section 410 of the New York Code of Crim-
inal Procedure provides that if, at any time after the evidence on either side is
closed, the court deem it insufficient to warrant a conviction of one or more of
the crimes in the indictment of information, it may advise the jury to acquit the
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jurisdictions, to determine as a matter of law whether the proof
has been sufficient to overcome the presumption of innocence,
and thus put the accused to a defense. All that the jury is re-
quired to do is formally to declare that the defendant is not
guilty. In England, too, a judge can stop a trial at any time
after the case for the prosecution is completed and direct the
jury to say "not guilty." The juries in the cases reported in
Borchard's Convicting the Innocent did not adequately protect
innocent defendants. As fact-finders, honest judges are gen-
erally better than the contemporary jury. In olden times, the
jury had the "facts" themselves.
The Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure does not provide
for a directed verdict of acquittal, and the jurisprudence holds
that the trial judge is unauthorized to direct the jury at any
stage of the proceeding, on the theory that it is within the ex-
clusive province of the jury to determine whether the evidence
in the case establishes the guilt of the accused beyond a reason-
able doubt. 148 As a result, even an obviously unfounded prosecu-
tion must be continued to the very end, unless the district at-
torney chooses to nolle prosequi the charge. In 1950, a statute
was enacted in Louisiana which authorizes a motion for a di-
rected verdict of acquittal in cases tried by a judge alone, by
either the defendant or the court after either side presents its
evidence. 49 The purpose of the statute is to give the accused
some protection against unnecessary prolongation of unfounded
charges, but the relief afforded is only partial, and perhaps
ineffectual.150 The statute does not provide for a directed ver-
dict of acquittal in cases tried by a jury. The general purpose
of a directed verdict is to give the judge control over the jury's
defendant thereof and they must follow the advice. The court cannot advise a
conviction. See also A.L.I. CODE OF Ca. PROC. § 321; FED. R. Ca. PRO. 29(a). On
a motion 'by defendant for a directed verdict, the evidence must be viewed in the
light most favorable to the prosecution. See Hardee v. United States, 231 F.2d
649 (4th Cir. 1956).
148. State v. Haddad, 221 La. 337, 59 So.2d 411 (1952) ; State v. Pascal, 147
La. 634, 85 So. 621 (1920) ; State v. Dudenhefer, 122 La. 288, 47 So. 614 (1908).
Although the judge in jury trials in Louisiana cannot direct a verdict of guilty or
acquittal, he is not bound to receive the first verdict brought in by the jury, but
may direct them to reconsider it, unless the jury insist on having it recorded.
This is so even though the first verdict may be one of not guilty.
149. La. Act 447 of 1950, now LA. R.S. 15:402.1 (1950). The defendant may
move for an acquittal at the close of the evidence offered by the prosecution with-
out yielding his right to introduce later evidence should the motion be denied.
150. See Bennett, Louisiana Criminal Procedure, 14 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
11, 30 (1953), Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court, 13 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW




verdict, but this statute allows the directed verdict of acquittal
only in cases tried by the judge alone. In judge-tried cases, as
well as in jury trials, a motion for a directed verdict at the con-
clusion of the state's evidence is seldom well founded. The dis-
trict attorney usually does not bring a case to trial unless the
evidence is at least sufficient to establish a prima facie case.
As a consequence, a directed verdict has real value only after
both sides have presented their case. In a judge-tried case, how-
ever, a directed verdict of acquittal after the evidence of both
sides has been presented is not of great benefit. The judge, at
that stage of the trial, is ready to decide upon the guilt or
innocence of the accused. He would rule upon the motion as he
would decide upon the guilt or innocence of the accused.
Should the judge have the right to direct a verdict of acquit-
tal? One of the purposes served by trial by jury is that it
gives protection against laws which the ordinary man may re-
gard as harsh and oppressive. A right in the judge to direct a
verdict of acquittal does not jeopardize the jury as a safeguard
against repugnant laws. But the value of the jury does not lie
solely in the fact that it gives protection against unfair laws.
Besides being an instrument for doing justice, the jury serves
as a safeguard of the independence and quality of judges. The
outlook of the judge may become remote from that of the ordi-
nary man, and a jury trial insures that people get the kind of
justice they want.151 A right in the judge to direct a verdict of
acquittal might work against this safeguard.
XII. JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT
In criminal matters, a judgment non obstante veredicto,
whereby the court enters a judgment contrary to the jury ver-
dict, is unheard of at common law.15 2 The principal argument
against the judgment n.o.v. is that it constitutes an invasion of
the function of the jury in the making of the verdict. Just as a
case cannot be withdrawn from the jury, so too there cannot be
a judgment n.o.v. If the judge in a criminal case cannot direct
a verdict before the jury retires, it cannot reasonably be argued
that he can reserve decision and overrule a verdict after the jury
151. See DEVLIN, Op. cit. supra note 1, at 158, 160. But cf. Sparf and Hansen
v. United States, 156 U.S. 51 (1895).
152. See DEVLIN, Op. cit. supra note 1, at 75. In early English law, when thejury returned a verdict contrary to the evidence and found a defendant guilty, the
most the court could do was to "reprieve the person convict before judgment, and
to acquaint the king, and certify for his pardon." See 2 HALE, PLEAS OF TE
CRowN 309-310 (1736).
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has deliberated, and render a contrary judgment. The converse
would be true if the judge could direct a verdict before the jury
has deliberated. If the judge can direct a verdict of acquittal,
as he can in some states, he should be able to overrule the jury
after it has deliberated. What is sufficient to direct a verdict
before the jury retires is sufficient to set aside a verdict after
deliberation. An appeal by the state from an acquittal by the
trial judge notwithstanding a jury's verdict of guilty would
probably not involve double jeopardy because the appellate court
would not need to order a new trial but could reinstate the jury's
verdict of guilty.153
XIII. MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL
In criminal matters, the old common law did not allow a new
trial. The convicted defendant was not allowed to dispute the
jury's verdict. Having "put himself on his country" to be judged
by his neighbors, the prisoner was bound by their verdict just
as he had to abide by the outcome of the ordeal or battle. 4 If,
instead of finding the defendant guilty, the jury improperly
acquitted him, the jury could be punished for misconduct, but
the defendant could not be punished, as there could be no new
trial. It was considered just as unfair to put a person twice on
trial as it would have been to make him fight a second battle or
endure a second ordeal. 155 As an English judge said in 1724:
"It was never yet known that a verdict was set aside by which
the defendant was acquitted, in any case whatsoever upon a
criminal prosecution"' 1 6 and as Lord Chief Justice Mansfield
once put it: "It is the duty of the judge, in all cases of general
justice, to tell the jury how to do right, though they have it in
their power to do wrong, which is a matter entirely between
God and their own consciences.' 15 7 And as another judge said:
153. See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 323 (1937).
154. See DEVLIN, op. cit. supra note 1, at 76. The remedy of an accused in
cases where a verdict was returned for the prosecution that was contrary to the
evidence, or where the court erred as to a matter of law, was a recommendation
to pardon, signed by the judge, and this was granted as a matter of course. The
remedy where there was an error of fact was by a proceeding called a writ coram
nobis, which was a very common remedy in civil cases, but was seldom resorted to
in criminal matters. See Amandes, Coram Nobis-Panacea or Carcinoma, 7 HAS-
TINGS L.J. 48 (1955) ; Notes, 37 HARV. L. REV. 744, 774 (1924).
155. See DEVLIN, op. cit. supra note 1, at 77.
156. Chief Justice Pratt in R. v. Jones, (1724) 8 Mod. 201, 208, quoted in
DEVLIN, op. cit. supra note 1, at 77.
157. R. v. Dean of St. Asaph, 21 How. St. Trials 847, 1039 (1783). See also




"I admit the jury have the power of finding a verdict against
the law and so they have of finding a verdict against evidence,
but I deny they have the right to do so.""'
Whatever reasons may have existed in England for disallow-
ing a new trial in case of conviction of the defendant, it is gen-
erally conceded that there is no sufficient grounds for adopting
or continuing the practice. Clearly, the principle that a prisoner
should not be subjected to a second trial for the same offense
was designed for his benefit and it was not intended that one
who has been wrongly convicted should be prevented from
having a second inquiry into his offense.
The Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure allows a motion
for a new trial whenever the verdict is contrary to the law and
the evidence, 159 and it can be granted only upon the motion of
the defendant. l 0 Although the trial judge cannot comment upon
the facts prior to verdict, he is given the right to decide after
verdict whether the facts justify the verdict and, accordingly,
to refuse or grant a new trial. The power to grant a new trial,
to a lesser degree than the power to direct a verdict, enables
the judge to exercise control over the verdict of the jury.'
When a motion for a new trial is granted, the verdict is set aside
with a resulting trial de novo of the case. 6 2 The result of a
motion for a new trial is a reconsideration of the defendant's
case by another jury. It is distinguishable from a directed ver-
dict and from a judgment n.o.v., where the verdict of the jury is
coerced or definitely set aside and the defendant is discharged.
According to the majority of jurisdictions, the trial judge
should not set aside a verdict of guilty as "being contrary to
the law and the evidence" when some evidence is presented upon
which the jury could have reasonably based their conclusion.163
158. Justice Willes in R. v. Shipley (1784) 4 Doug. 171, 178, quoted in DEV-
LIN, Op. cit. supra note 1, at 88. See also Note, 19 MIcH. L. REV. 325 (1921).
159. LA. R.S. 15:509 (1950) sets forth these grounds for a motion for a new
trial: "(1) Whenever the verdict is contrary to the law and the evidence; or (2)
Whenever the bills of exception reserved during the proceedings show error com-
mitted to the prejudice of the accused; or (3) Whenever since verdict new ma-
terial evidence has been discovered that could not have been discovered with rea-
sonable diligence before or during the trial; or (4) whenever since verdict accused
has discovered errors or defects in the proceedings to his prejudice that could not
have been discovered with reasonable diligence before verdict. See also A.L.I.
CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE §§ 364, 365.
160. LA. R.S. 15:505 (1950). The doctrine of double jeopardy bars the grant-
ing of a new trial to the state.
161. See State v. Daspit, 167 La. 53, 118 So. 690 (1928).
162. LA. R.S. 15:515 (1950).
163. See Bennett, Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court, 6 LoUISIANA LAW
REVIEW 650, 671 (1946).
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But in Louisiana, the trial judge can set aside a verdict when he
believes the jury to be wrong and entertains a reasonable doubt
as to the defendant's guilt. 6 4 Although the formulation of the
rule is different, the practice in Loui~iana is similar by and
large to that in other states.
Inasmuch as the defendant was actually convicted on the
first trial, and as the verdict was set aside on request by the
person convicted, a trial de novo of the case does not constitute
double jeopardy. However, the defendant in all probability will
not be placed on trial again unless the district attorney is able
to strengthen his case.1
6 5
The Louisiana Supreme Court in reviewing criminal cases
is limited to questions of law and is not permitted to invoke
its appellate or supervisory jurisdiction to review the granting
or refusing to grant a re-trial for errors of facts.16 6 Since the
granting or refusing a motion for a new trial for reason of
the insufficiency of the evidence usually involves a question of
fact, the propriety of and necessity for granting a new trial for
insufficiency of evidence is a matter entirely within the discre-
tion of the trial judge.16 7 However, as the law requires that a
conviction be based upon evidence beyond a reasonable doubt of
the defendant's guilt, the question of whether there is sufficient
evidence is a question of law. The court has ruled that the
refusal of a trial judge to grant the motion is appealable in
cases where there is no evidence tending to support the convic-
tion. If the trial judge overrules a motion for a new trial when
no evidence at all is adduced to prove a necessary element of the
164. See State v. Daspit, 167 La. 53, 118 So. 690 (1928) ; Bennett, Work of
the Loui8iana Supreme Court, 5 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 554, 573 (1944).
165. When a new trial is granted, the state, regardless of an incorrect ruling
by the trial judge, is without right of appeal. The trial judge's holding that the
evidence does not support the verdict does not present a question of law over
which the Supreme Court has jurisdiction. Furthermore, it should be noted that
the granting of a new trial is not a final disposition of the case, and therefore not
subject to an appeal, since an appeal lies only from a final prejudicial judgment.
See LA. R.S. 15:540 (1950).
166. Id. 15:516.
167. In the case of State v. Ricks, 170 La. 507, 128 So. 293 (1930), the trial
judge denied a motion for a new trial and the defendant on appeal argued to the
court that the verdict was contrary to the evidence. The Supreme Court held that
it can only pass on questions of law and not on the guilt or innocence of the
accused, and therefore could not review the trial judge's ruling on the motion
for a new trial. Any other ruling would be contrary to the constitutional pro-
vision which gives the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over questions of law
alone. See LA. COcST. art. 7, § 10; State v. Tucker, 204 La. 463, 15 So.2d 854
(1943).
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crime, a question of law is presented which is reviewable on
appeal. 168
The power of the jury, as Sir Devlin has put it, is limited
at the ends. 169 The jury operates, as it were, upon the middle of
the evidence; it must not act entirely without evidence and it
must not go entirely against the evidence. 170 The judge deter-
mines whether there is any evidence to justify the verdict; the
jury determines whether there is enough evidence. A verdict,
except a verdict of acquittal, is set aside unless the judge thinks
that there is evidence upon which reasonable men could act.
There is a certain minimum of evidence which the law requires
.of a verdict.
XIV. SUSPENSION OF SENTENCE
The suspension of sentence is a way to control the jury's
verdict. The suspended sentence originated as a device whereby
the judge could avoid imposing upon a convicted person the
legal penalty for his crime. It was a reaction to the severe
punishment common in England during an early period, and
also to the want of power in common law courts to grant new
trials and to the absence of a right to review convictions in a
higher court. The judge released the convicted defendant either
168. As Chief Justice O'Niell remarked in State v. Martinez, 201 La. 949, 953,
10 So.2d 712, 713 (1942) : "The line is drawn between an insufficiency of evidence
and a total lack of evidence of the fact or facts required to prove the guilt of the
party accused." In State v. Giangosso, 157 La. 360, 102 So. 429 (1924), the de-
fendant was charged with buying stolen property. The facts in the case clearly
showed that the property in fact was never stolen. The trial judge refused a new
trial but he admitted, in his per curiam to the bill of exception based on refusal
to grant a new trial, that the evidence produced show that the property was never
stolen. The Supreme Court held that a question of law was presented, which is
reviewable on appeal, since no evidence at all was adduced against the accused.
Again, in State v. Wooderson, 213 La. 40, 34 So.2d 369 (1948), where the de-
fendant was charged with the performance of an act of lewdness in public, and the
only evidence was that the defendant proposed immoral conduct to a woman, the
court held that when no evidence is offered on which a conviction can be predi-
cated, a question of law is presented over which the Supreme Court has jurisdic-
tion. See also State v. Calloway, 213 La. 129, 34 So.2d 399 (1948). The New
York Court of Appeals, with three judges dissenting, held in People v. Porearo,
189 N.Y.S.2d 194, 6 N.Y.2d 248 (1959), that evidence consisting entirely of testi-
mony by alleged victim, a ten-year-old child, without any circumstantial evidence
attesting to its veracity, was insufficient to sustain a convicton of the defendant
of impairing the morals of a minor.
169. See DEVLIN, op. Cit. supra note 1, at 61 et seq.
170. See id. at 65. The rule that a verdict must be supported by some evidence
or it will be set aside is used generally to defeat a verdict for the plaintiff or the
party having the burden of proof, because he has not brought enough evidence to
discharge the burden; the rule that the verdict will be set aside if, although sup-
ported by some evidence is contrary to the weight of evidence, is used generally to
defeat a verdict given against the party who has brought overwhelming proof. See
id. at 62.
JURY VERDICT IN CRIMINAL LAW
before or after sentence was passed, and if he subsequently
committed a delinquency or crime the sentence for the previous
offense was immediately imposed. The judge was thus able to
release a defendant whom he believed to be innocent or to give
a second chance to an offender whom he believed would make a
satisfactory adjustment in the community.
In the United States, the use of the suspended sentence was
justified by reference to the English common law. In 1916, how-
ever, the United States Supreme Court said that the power to
suspend sentences was not inherent in the courts but could be
granted by statute.' 7 ' Most states, recognizing the failure of
prisons as a means of rehabilitation, have provided by statute
for the suspension of sentence. As a rule, these statutes au-
thorize the suspension of the imposition of sentence (the pro-
nouncing of the terms of punishment) as well as the execution
of sentence (the putting into effect of the punishment as pro-
nounced). The Louisiana statute is narrower in scope, as its
authorization is limited to the suspension of the execution of
sentence. 172 It allows suspension of sentence in non-capital
cases. 173 The suspension of sentence, either its pronouncement
or its enforcement, has been objected to as an encroachment on
the pardoning power of the executive. 7 4
XV. APPEAL
In England, prior to the American Revolution, the trial court
171. ET parte United States, 242 U.S. 27 (1916). See GLUECK, PROBATION
AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 26 (1933) ; TIMASHEFF, ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF PROBA-
TION (1941); Note, 12 COL. L. REV. 543 (1912).
172. Suspension of sentence has been possible in Louisiana by statute since
1914. See La. Act 74 of 1914; LA. R.S. 15:530-538 (1950). A sixty-day post-
ponement of the imposition of sentence is permitted in cases in which the accused
has pleaded guilty, or waived a jury trial and has been found guilty, while an
investigation by a probation officer is made to assist the trial judge in determin-
ing whether or not to place the offender on probation. Id. 15:531.
173. Id. 15:530.
174. See Note, 12 COL. L. REV. 543 (1912). The suspended sentence in itself
does not provide for supervision and therefore is not wholly defensible from the
point of view of rehabilitation of the offender. The offender, if left to his own
devices, will often continue in his old patterns of misconduct. The suspended sen-
tence is the basis, however, of probation, which does provide supervision. In Lou-
isiana, a convicted felon who is granted a suspended sentence is placed on proba-
tion under the supervision of the department of public welfare. LA. R.S. 15:530
(1950). The court is free to place him on probation on such terms and condi-
tions as it may deem best. Id. 15:530. The court is not permitted to suspend
sentence and grant probation to a felon who has begun to serve his sentence. Id.
15:530. With regard to misdemeanors, however, the court is authorized to suspend
the execution of any misdemeanor sentence even though the prisoner has been
incarcerated. Id. 15:536. The grant of probation while a prisoner is serving his
sentence might be objected to as an infringement upon the executive prerogative
of pardon and parole. See Slovenko, The Treatment of the Criminal in Louisiana
and Elsewhere, 34 TuL. L. REV. 523 (1960).
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was not only the first but also the final court. Gradually the
possibility of having a conviction reviewed in an appellate court
was developed." 75 In America, persons convicted of either mis-
demeanors or felonies have always been allowed to appeal the
decision of the trial court. 7
The defendant's right to an appellate review is not matched
by a similar right for the prosecution. The state, in effect, has
175. See KENNY, OUTLINES OF CRIMINAL LAW 586 (15th ed. 1936); 1
STEPHEN, HISTORY OF CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 308 (1883) ; Note, 47 YALE
L.J. 489 (1938).
176. The Louisiana Constitution gives the Supreme Court supervisory or
"writ" jurisdiction over all inferior courts and appellate jurisdiction over
"criminal cases in which the penalty of death or imprisonment at hard labor may
be imposed, or in which a fine exceeding three hundred dollars or imprisonment
exceeding six months has been actually imposed." LA. CONST. art. VII, § 10.
Two classes of criminal cases are designated: (1) those which may be punishable
by death or imprisonment at hard labor, and (2) those where a fine exceeding
$300 or imprisonment exceeding six months is actually imposed. In the first-
mentioned class of cases (felonies), the question of appellate jurisdiction is'
determined by the character of the offense charged as measured by the punishment:
that may be inflicted, whereas in the last-mentioned class of cases (misdemeanors),
jurisdiction is determined, not by the penalty that may be imposed, but by that
which is actually imposed, and which must be a fine exceeding $300 or an im-
prisonment exceeding six months. See, e.g., State v. Price, 164 La. 376, 113 So.
882 (1927) ; State v. Shushan, 204 La. 672, 16 So.2d 227 (1943).
The appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in criminal cases is limited
to questions of law alone. LA. CONST. art. VII, § 10. A defendant who establishes
a complete lack of proof of an essential element of the crime, by incorporating a
full transcript of the testimony in his bill of exceptions, presents an error of law
in the refusal of the trial judge to set aside the verdict of guilty. See supra note
169; see also Bennett, The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court, 15 LOUISIANA
LAW REvIEW 371, 372 (1955).
The appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in civil cases extends to both
questions of fact and law, La. Const. art. VII, § 10, and as a result, there are
few jury trials in civil cases in Louisiana. As a result of the Louisiana Direct
Action Statute, LA. R.S. 22:655 (1950), a large volume of damage suit litigation
has gone from the state courts to the federal court, under diversity jurisdiction.
Diversity jurisdiction is possible because in the great majority of cases the in-
jured person is a citizen of Louisiana and the insurer a foreign corporation. See
dissenting opinion by Judge Rives in Elbert v. Lumbermen's Mutual Cas. Co., 202
F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1953) ; Notes, 66 HARv. L. REV. 1529, (1953), 40 VA. L. REV.
801 (1954). Many plaintiffs' counsel prefer the federal forum because there they
have the advantages or prejudices of a trial by jury. It is generally assumed that
two factors lead plaintiffs to prefer the federal forum: (1) the federal jury
verdicts are higher than the state court judgments, and (2) the federal appellate
courts are limited in the review of the facts as determined by the trial court in
contrast to the comprehensive review permitted under the Louisiana Constitution.
In a concurring opinion, in Lumbermen's Mat. Cas. Co. v. Elbert, 348 U.S. 48,
57 (1954), Justice Frankfurter said: "In concrete terms, she [the plaintiff]
can cash in on the law governing jury trials in the federal courts, with its restric-
tive appellate review of jury verdicts, and escape rooted jurisprudence of Lou-
isiana law in reviewing jury verdicts." See Notes, 53 MiCe. L. REV. 1000 (1955) :
29 TUL. L. REV. 788 (1955). It is ironic that diversity jurisdiction, which was.
based on the desire of the framers of the United States Constitution to assure
out-of-state litigants courts free from susceptibility to potential local bias, is the
vehicle by which Louisiana plaintiffs resort to federal court in order to avoid the
consequences of the Louisiana law by which every Louisiana citizen is bound in
suing another Louisiana citizen. See SCHUMACHER, LOUISIANA DIRECT AcTIoN
STATUTE (unpublished thesis in Tulane Law School Library, 1958).
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no appeal after acquittal, regardless of the trial irregularities
committed, inasmuch as a new trial would be barred by the
double jeopardy provision of the Constitution.'7 7 Similarly, on
the trial level of procedure, the state is not entitled to a motion
for a new trial or to a judgment notwithstanding a verdict of
not guilty. A verdict of asquittal is sacrosanct. A man goes
free when his countrymen acquit him. No matter how irrational
the acquittal, it is considered better to accept it than to try the
case over again. It makes no difference if the defendant cries
out to the world: "The jury was all wrong - I did it." No new
trial for the crime can be taken against an acquitted man.'
7 8
The power of the jury to acquit is a consequence of the Anglo-
American system of putting the burden of proof on the prose-
cution. It is not for the defendant to prove that he did not
commit the crime. Thus, if the prosecutor places a person on
trial too early, that is, before they have collected all relevant
evidence, the discovery of additional evidence after the defend-
ant's acquittal will be of no avail. An acquitted person can rest
secure in the knowledge that no fresh evidence of the crime will
ever imperil him.
XVI. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, it seems particularly important to allude to
the significance of the jury in the democratic process. The Eng-
lish jury system was widely copied at first, but the institution,
except in the United States, has been generally abandoned. 179
Is trial by jury mere dross, or does it have real value? Should
the role of the jury be reduced or even be altogether abolished?
A number of observers have expressed dissatisfaction with
the jury. To quote some of them: I have no faith in the jury "in
respect of any case lasting more than two days." "Some of the
juries I've seen ought to be taken out into a wood, laid down
gently side by side, and covered over with leaves."' 80 These
177. See Slovenko, The Law on Double Jeopardy, 30 TUL. L. REV. 409 (1956).
178. Criminal defendants are rarely, if ever, punished for perjury. It is ex-
pected that defendants who plead "not guilty" will tell lies on the witness stand.
In European procedure, the accused is not examined under oath. Since most men
will lie to save their skins, it is considered of no use to make them perjurers by
compelling them to take an oath. See Ploscowe, The Investigating Magistrate
(Juge d'Instruction) in European Criminal Procedure, 33 MiC. L. REV. 1010
(1935).
179. England, the home of the jury system, abolished the grand jury in 1933
and, as a matter of practice, rarely uses the jury trial in civil cases. Juries dis-
appeared from civil actions during World War II.
180. See Rolph, Too Many Acquittals, 32 NEW STATESMAN AND NATION 478
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observers consider that the best reform of the jury system would
be to abolish it. Juries, they say, are incompetent, confused,
embarrassed, and gullible ;18i they cause more injustice than they
avert by the number of guilty criminals they let off. 18 2 The jury
system, they say, has been an unhappy adventure in trial pro-
cedure.
Reformers of the judicial process believe that the trial should
be converted into a scientific investigation.183 It is generally
recognized that many of the incidents of a trial are bizarre from
the standpoint of science. For one thing, jurors are amateurist
and are not equipped to get at the "facts," and some evidence
that might actually help in the search for facts is barred, pri-
marily because there is believed to be a danger in letting the
jury hear it. The jury is particularly likely to succumb to emo-
tional reactions. The aura of the combat of trial makes it almost
impossible for the juror to remain detached, and, in a way, he
becomes a participating observer. The scientific observer, on the
other hand, relies heavily on the "value-free" aspect of his posi-
tion. The decision of the juror tends to be a gestalt response to
the trial. 8 4
The essential function of the jury, however, is not to find
the "truth" of the controversy. The significance of the jury is
more political than anything else. And the scientific investiga-
tion of controversies is not possible in a system which is domi-
nated by political considerations. 8 5 The fact that approximately
(Dec. 28, 1946); Rolph, Traverse Jury, 48 NEW STATESMAN 8 (July 3, 1954).
See also FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 110-145 (1949).
181. "There is no other comparable activity in life in which experience is not
regarded as an asset, no other social institution with such haphazard and fleeting
membership." WILLIAMS, TILE PROOF OF GUILT 208 (1955). "Would any sensible
business organization reach a decision, as to the competence and honesty of a
prospective executive, by seeking, on that question of fact, the judgment of
twelve men or women gathered together at random-and after first weeding out
all those men or women who might have any special qualifications for answering
the questions? Would an historian thus decide a question of fact? If juries are
better than judges as fact-finders, then, were we sensible, we would allow no
cases to be decided by a judge without a jury. But that is not our practice -
I know of no one who proposes that all those [admiralty and equity] cases shall
be jury cases." FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 110 (1949).
182. See SEAGLE, LAW: THE SCIENCE OF INEFFICIENCY 107 (1952).
183. Schur, Scientific Method and Criminal Trial Decision, 25 SOCIAL RES.
173 (1958) ; SEAGLE, LAW: TIHE SCIENCE OF INEFFICIENCY 33 (1952) ; see also
Cowan, Jurisprudence in the Teaching of Torts, 9 J. OF LEGAL ED. 444, 455
(1957).
184. See Schur, Scientific Method and Criminal Trial Decision, 25 SOCIAL RES.
173 (1958) ; Weld and Danzig, Study of the Way in Which a Verdict is Reached
by a Jury, 53 AM. J. PSYCHOLOGY 518 (1940).
185. See Rolph, Too Many Acquittals, 32 NEW STATESMAN AND NATION 478
(Dec. 28, 1946).
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one in four persons tried for crime is let off by the jury is
pretty good evidence that jurors are not "value-free" observers.
Most people with experience in criminal courts believe that
persons on trial for crime committed the act for which they are
charged. The presumption of innocence at trial is almost comic.
A presumption of guilt would better accord with realities.8 6 It
is rarely possible for an innocent man to be sent before a jury.
Before the case gets so far, it encounters too many hurdles for
that. Somewhere in the chain of preliminaries, the fact that the
man is innocent becomes quite clear. The jury's verdict of "not
guilty" means something quite different from "innocent."
The jury system rests on political premises. Montesquieu,
Blackstone, and their followers consider that lay tribunals with
a plurality of members are the safeguard of liberty.187 The pri-
186. See SEAGLE, LAW: THE SCIENCE OF INEFFICIENCY 107 .(1952).
187. See WYZANSKI, A TRIAL JUDGE'S FREEDOM AND RESPONSIBILITY, 65
HARY. L. REV. 1281 (1952). Professor Calamandrei of the University of Florence
has stated: "The jury system was abolished in Italy by the Fascist regime, pri-
marily for political reasons, because it appeared to be one of those institutions
inspired by the nineteenth-century doctrine of popular sovereignty, anathema to
the Fascist dictatorship; and in place of the jury system, in which the decision
is formulated in two chronologically distinct steps, through the joint efforts of
two different bodies operating independently, a single body with mixed member-
ship was formed, composed of regular judges and so-called assessors, whose deci-
sions were required to be reasoned on questions of fact and of law, according to
the regular rules.
"The jury system was not re-established after the fall of Fascism. Although
the political factors that led to its abolition were no longer valid, there remained
technical reasons that counseled against its reintroduction. The present Constitu-
tion has re-established the principle of the 'direct participation of the people in
the administration of justice' (Art. 102) ; but since according to Article 111 of
the same Constitution all judicial decisons without exception must include a
reasoned opinion, it has been held that this unqualified constitutional provision
prevents the reintroduction of the unreasoned jury verdict. Thus the decisions of
the Courts of Assizes must be fully reasoned today in fact and in law, and appeal
is granted against any part of them. Perhaps this was a wise move, since the
traditional jury system, in which the jurors were called on to judge without giving
the reasons for their verdict, seems to have been fashioned- as experience has
borne out-for the very purpose of encouraging the jurors to judge unreason-
ably; and so, rather than the faithful expression of the social conscience, their
verdict often appeared to be the triumph of pure irrationality, an irrationality that
was all the more dangerous in that it was not susceptible to appeal." CALAMAN-
DREI, PROCEDURE AND DEMOCRACY 56-57 (tr. J. and H. Adams, 1956). But is the
primary value of the jury to find facts?
188. In England, when the death penalty was imposed for thefts of property
over 40 shillings in value, the jury inevitably found valuable property to be worth
less than 40 shillings so as to avoid the death penalty. In addition to serving as a
checl on unpopular law and unpopular enforcement of the law, the institution of
the jury serves to develop the spirit of citizenship. In Latin America, for example,
there were populations of diverse racial origin, divided into castes, and separated
by distrust, antipathy, and ill feeling. To eradicate these differences arising from
wealth, social position, or traditional prerogatives, the jury system was indis-
pensable. By getting all these groups to participate together in a jury, there
develops a common feeling of trust and faith among all members of the body
politic. See RODRIGUEZ, THE LIVINGSTON CODES IN THE GUATEMALAN CRISIS OF
1837-1838, p. 13 (Middle American Research Institute, Tulane University, 1955) ;
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mary value of the jury is not to find facts but to serve as a
check on unpopular law and unpopular enforcement of the law. 18
The jury is an institution which protects the people against
governmental tyranny.1' Wilfully perverse verdicts of "not
guilty" have forced many humane reforms in the criminal law.
And the jury protects the people against judicial prejudice and
carelessness. Jury service is one of the hard-won privileges
of citizenship, the common man's opportunity to restrain the
judiciary. It is true that there is a reluctance to serve on juries,
but this is because of the financial hardship involved.190
The jury's relationship with the trial judge has varied, de-
pending to a great extent upon the political climate. Sir Patrick
Devlin in his admirable little book Trial by Jury draws a parallel,
which is accurate if not pushed too far, between the relationship
of the executive to Parliament in the matter of legislation and
the relationship of the judge to the jury. As Sir Devlin puts it:
"In the last resort Parliament makes the law just as a jury
makes the verdict. But Parliament accepts the direction of the
executive in much the same way as a jury accepts the direction
of the judge. The power of initiating and formulating legisla-
tion which is held by the executive bears a general resemblance
to the powers of the judge over the trial - those of defining
the field of inquiry, settling the minimum of evidence which
must support a verdict and the maximum which must not be
ignored, and of formulating the issues to be tried. The judge
gets his way by giving directions of law and the executive gets
it by the party whip; and both sorts of command may in matters
of conscience be rejected."1 91
Today, by and large, the executive has the upper hand. So
too there is an increase in the power of the judge over the jury
or in trial by judge alone. This is, needless to say, the age of the
big father figure. 92
Slovenko, The Jury System in Louisiana Criminal Law, 17 LOUISIANA LAW
REVIEW 655, 669-670 (1957).
189. In effect, the jury system is as dependable as the community from which
the jury is picked. Radical defendants in the years of the witch hunt usually
preferred trial without a jury. See Robinson, Bias, Probability, and Trial by
Jury, 15 AM. SOCIOL. REV. 73 (1950) ; Strodbeck, Social Status in Jury Delibera-
tions, 22 AM. SOCIOL. REV. 713 (1957).
190. Reasonable payment for jury service is in order. See LA. R.S. 13:3049
(1950) (eight dollars per day). Citizenship in the modern state is a job with
growing expenses. It is true that a citizen does not expect to be paid for voting,
but voting does not entail financial hardship. A person is paid when he is con-
scripted into the service.
191. See DEVLIN, op. cit. supra note 1, at 162.
192. See Howe, Juries as Judges of Criminal Law, 52 HARV. L. REV. 582
(1939).
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